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THE REINTEGRATIVE STATE
Joy Radice
ABSTRACT
Public concern has mounted about the essentially permanent stigma created
by a criminal record. This is no small problem when the U.S. criminal history
database currently stores seventy-seven million criminal records, and poor
people and people of color constitute a severely disproportionate number of
them. A criminal record makes it harder for people to find housing, get hired,
attend college, and reunite with their families. Yet these very things have the
greatest chance of helping people lead law-abiding lives and reducing
recidivism. Scholars, legislators, and advocates have confronted this problem
by arguing for reforms that give people with a conviction a second chance.
States have responded. By one count, from 1994 to 2014, over forty state
legislatures passed 155 statutes to mitigate the civil collateral consequences of
a criminal record. Although states have recognized that they have an interest in
reintegrating their citizens with convictions, most people with criminal records
cannot return to full citizenship. The stigma of a conviction follows them for a
lifetime, even for the most minor crimes.
This Article takes a systematic look at state reforms and integrates them into
a more workable and effective whole, which I call the Reintegrative State. It
makes four contributions to the growing literature on collateral consequences
and criminal records. First, it argues that there is a state interest, if not
obligation, to create an intentional and sequenced process to remove civil legal
disabilities triggered by a conviction and to mitigate the permanency of public
criminal records. Second, this Article argues that reintegrating people with
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convictions back into society is consistent with the state’s interest in punishment
and public safety, especially in light of criminology research showing that a
significant number of people stop committing crimes. Third, it critiques current
state experiments with reentry initiatives as piecemeal, discretionary,
inadministrable, and limited to a narrow segment of people with criminal
records. Fourth and finally, this Article argues that the state can and should be
the external force that destigmatizes a person with a conviction by reestablishing
that person’s legal status. To do so effectively, the state must incorporate
reintegration approaches throughout the criminal justice system—not just after
sentencing or after release. The Reintegrative State envisions a holistic
framework for helping those with criminal records re-assimilate into society.
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INTRODUCTION
We are in a reentry moment. From pontiffs to pundits, public dialogue
reflects concern for how we treat people with convictions. In his first speech to
Congress in 2015, Pope Francis stated that “society can only benefit from the
rehabilitation of those convicted of crimes . . . . [A] just and necessary
punishment must never exclude the dimension of hope and the goal of
rehabilitation.”1 Comedian John Oliver aired a news segment on his HBO news
series, Last Week Tonight, that discussed the obstacles to reentry and concluded
“[o]ver 95% of all prisoners will eventually be released, so it’s in everyone’s
interest that we try to give them a better chance of success. Because under the

1 Mark Berman, Pope Francis Tells Congress ‘Every Life Is Sacred,’ Says the Death Penalty Should Be
Abolished, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/09/24/
pope-francis-tells-congress-the-death-penalty-should-be-abolished/.
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current system, if they do manage to overcome all the obstacles we’ve set, it’s a
minor miracle.”2
This public concern does not signal a shift to “go soft on crime.” It simply
recognizes that a significant number of people with convictions stop committing
crimes, and that saddling them with a lifelong public criminal record and statecreated statutory obstacles to fully reintegrating may be counterproductive,
inefficient, and unfair. Further compelling the need for reform is the fact that the
criminal justice system has long been critiqued for its disproportionate impact
on poor people of color and their communities.
Even the National District Attorneys Association acknowledges the
impediment of these post-conviction civil collateral consequences.3 Some states
have added lifting collateral consequences to the responsibilities of prosecutors
or probation officers as a way to mitigate the impact of a criminal conviction
after a person’s criminal sentence is complete. For example, in Tennessee,
prosecutors are tasked by statute to help people expunge charges and convictions
from their records,4 and in New York, probation officers help people apply for
Certificates of Good Conduct that remove civil obstacles to being awarded a
state employment license or securing housing.5
This Article takes a systematic look at state reforms that currently exist and
integrates them into a more workable and effective whole, which I call the
Reintegrative State. The Reintegrative State recognizes a state's interest in
helping individuals reintegrate back into society after a conviction by restoring
rights and privileges lost by a conviction, removing collateral consequences, and
mitigating the permanency of public criminal records. The Reintegrative State
develops a holistic framework sequencing reintegration approaches throughout
the criminal justice system—not just after sentencing or after release—that are
automatic, proportional, and intentional.
This Article contributes to the growing literature6 on collateral consequences
and criminal records by framing the debate over collateral consequences and
2 Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, Prisoner Re-entry, YOUTUBE (Nov. 8, 2015), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=gJtYRxH5G2k.
3 See NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, POLICY POSITIONS ON PRISONER REENTRY ISSUES (2005),
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/policy_position_prisoner_reentry_july_17_05.pdf; see also Robert M. A. Johnson, A
Prosecutor’s Expanded Responsibilities Under Padilla, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 129, 134–36 (2001).
4 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32-101(g)(7)–(8) (2016).
5 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 705(1), 753 (McKinney 2014).
6 See, e.g., DANIEL P. MEARS & JOSHUA C. COCHRAN, PRISONER REENTRY IN THE ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION (2015); JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISON REENTRY
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criminal records from the perspective of the state, and not from the perspective
of individuals with criminal records. To develop that thesis, first, this Article
argues that there is a state interest, if not an obligation, to create an intentional
and sequenced process to remove civil legal disabilities triggered by a conviction
and to mitigate the permanency of public criminal records. Second, this Article
argues that reintegrating people with convictions back into society is consistent
with the state’s interest in punishment and public safety, especially in light of
criminology research showing that a significant number of people stop
committing crimes.7 Third, it critiques current state experiments with reentry
initiatives as piecemeal, discretionary, inadministrable, and limited to a narrow
segment of people with criminal records. Fourth and finally, this Article argues
that the state can and should be the external force that destigmatizes a person
with a conviction by reestablishing that person’s pre-conviction legal status. To
do so effectively, the state must incorporate reintegration approaches throughout
the criminal justice system—not just after sentencing or after release. The
Reintegrative State envisions a holistic framework for helping those with
criminal records re-assimilate into society.
Here is the reintegration problem in a nutshell. Once a conviction is entered
in criminal court, even for some of the most minor offenses, like public
intoxication, disorderly conduct, or even speeding,8 a criminal record is created.
The U.S. criminal history database holds over 100 million criminal records.9
And with today’s technology, criminal records have become accessible to
anyone willing to pay for them, through state public records searches or

(2003); PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA (Jeremy Travis & Christy Visher eds., 2005); ANTHONY C.
THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING COMMUNITIES: REENTRY, RACE, AND POLITICS (2008).
7 See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Reentry as a Transient State Between Liberty and
Recommitment, in PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 50, 73 (Jeremy Travis & Christy Visher eds.,
2005).
8 For instance, in some states, a speeding violation may result in a misdemeanor conviction that remains
permanently on a person’s criminal history. See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-1 (2016) (making certain speeding
violations a misdemeanor); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-141(j1) (2006) (“A person who drives a vehicle on a
highway at a speed that is either more than 15 miles per hour more than the speed limit . . . or over 80 miles per
hour is guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-8-152(f)(2) (2016) (defining minor speeding
violations as a Class C misdemeanor); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-862 (2016) (defining a misdemeanor of reckless
driving as driving 20 miles per hour over the speed limit or above eighty miles per hour).
9 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DOJ, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS,
2012, at 3 (2014), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/244563.pdf; see also Gary Fields & John R.
Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18,
2014, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-records-rise-americans-find-consequences-can-last-alifetime-1408415402.
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thousands of online private databases.10 Even expunged records can remain in
private databases.11
These records mark the millions of individuals in this country who have not
been restored to their pre-conviction legal status because a single, even minor,
conviction alone can trigger a web of collateral consequences, a fact that
defendants rarely know at the time they enter a plea or are sentenced.12
Moreover, these state-created, post-conviction consequences are often unrelated
to a person’s specific criminal misconduct,13 so hundreds of consequences can
impact someone convicted of a minor crime and someone convicted of a violent
felony in just the same way and with the same force. This overbreadth
undermines successful reintegration. Consider a person convicted of illegally
selling a game ticket outside a baseball stadium. The criminal punishment for
this minor offense may only be unsupervised probation for six months. As a
result of the conviction, however, the person may be barred from public housing,
may lose his security guard license, and may be subject to excessive court costs,
which if unpaid can result in a loss of his driver’s license.14 Such obstacles to
finding housing and employment are two primary factors preventing successful
social reentry. This example is illustrative of the many types of civil statutory
consequences that are counterproductive to reintegrating people with
convictions, and can be more severe than the criminal punishment itself.

10 See JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 73 (2015) (“[T]here is now an entrenched
private sector infrastructure of commercial information vendors that meets and stokes demand for criminal
background checks.”); see also Martin Kaste, Digital Data Make for a Really Permanent Record, NPR (Oct. 29,
2009, 9:26 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114276194.
11 Kaste, supra note 10. And because public and private records are not systematically updated, these
records may not be accurate and often fail to remove those who have been restored to their pre-conviction status
by expungement or other forms of relief from their convictions. See Anna Kessler, Comment, Excavating
Expungement Law: A Comprehensive Approach, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 403, 413 (2015) (noting that private
information companies “run largely unregulated and are generally not required to update their records,” and
“[b]ecause of this lack of oversight, criminal records are often produced with omitted or misinterpreted
information”).
12 See Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions
and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 629–30 (2006); Michael
Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions:
An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 589–91 (2006); Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment:
An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT 15, 16–17 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
13 See infra Part I.C.2.
14 See infra Part I.B.1.
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A national ABA project completed in 2013 catalogued over 45,000 collateral
consequences15 nationwide, most of which were created in the last twenty
years.16 Scholars have illuminated the negative impact of this web of civil
consequences,17 which mitigates against full reintegration. Many point out that
these post-conviction consequences need significant legislative attention.18
Incrementally, state legislatures are responding to the call for change. Over
the past twenty years, states have amended their criminal statutes to include
reintegration or reentry as a goal of their criminal justice system, alongside the
longstanding goals of rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence.19 States have
also attempted to advance reintegration by passing expungement statutes,
funding job placement reentry programs, restoring voting rights, passing antidiscrimination laws, and establishing administrative relief mechanisms that
reduce civil sanctions and disabilities.20 By one count, from 2009 to 2014, over
forty state legislatures passed 155 statutes to remove or reduce collateral
consequences of a criminal record.21 But these changes still fall short of doing
the work of reintegration.
The policymakers and scholars who advocate for reform of collateral
consequences and critique the ubiquity of criminal records frame the debate as
a necessary balance between the state’s purported interest in collateral
15 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, NATIONAL SUMMIT ON COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 9–10 (2015),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/criminal_justice/summit_brochure.authcheckdam.pdf.
Collateral consequences often refer to “both those consequences that occur by operation of law at the time of
conviction . . . and those that occur as a result of some subsequent intervening event or discretionary decision.”
AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS 7 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS], http://www.
abanet.org/crimjust/standards/collateralsanctionwithcommentary.pdf.
16 Project Description—National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction (“NICCC”),
COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/description/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
17 Although “collateral consequences” is used throughout the literature, I prefer to use the terms “postconviction civil consequences” or “civil sanctions, forfeitures, or disabilities,” because those terms more
accurately describe how these state statutes function and impact people with criminal records.
18 See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 161–63 (1999); Alec Ewald & Christopher Uggen,
The Collateral Effects of Imprisonment on Prisoners, Their Families, and Communities, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 83, 84–85 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012); Andrew
von Hirsch & Martin Wasik, Civil Disqualifications Attending Conviction: A Suggested Conceptual Framework,
56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 599, 603 (1997); Pinard, supra note 12, at 689; Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the
Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45 B.C. L. REV. 255, 304–06 (2004).
19 See infra Part I.
20 See RAM SUBRAMANIAN, REBECKA MORENO & SOPHIA GEBRESELASSIE, RELIEF IN SIGHT? STATES
RETHINK THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION, 2009–2014 (2014).
21 Id. at 4, 11, 30.
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consequences to protect the public from future criminality and the individual’s
interest in removing the state-created barriers.22 This Article reframes the debate
over reintegration by presenting it solely from a state’s interests. Building on the
states’ and legal scholars’ partial solutions, this Article offers a more
comprehensive and sequenced approach: the Reintegrative State.
The Reintegrative State embraces reintegration as a state interest, alongside
punishment, from the very beginning of a person’s interaction with the criminal
justice system. It balances reintegration with the longstanding objectives of the
criminal justice system: retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. In doing so,
the Reintegrative State makes collateral consequences proportional to the
severity of the offense, offers individuals notice about collateral consequences
prior to sentencing, and offers individuals with criminal records a path to
removing them at some point after their sentence is complete.
To describe the path to the Reintegrative State, this Article proceeds in four
parts. Part I presents why states have an interest, if not an obligation, to remove
civil disabilities after a conviction and eliminate the discriminatory use of the
public criminal record. This interest and the various means of furthering it are
referred to in this Article as reintegration. Reintegration is consistent with, but
distinct from, the more commonly explored post-conviction concepts of reentry
and rehabilitation. This Part explains how reintegration is a more robust concept
and then describes two ways that post-conviction state action contributes to a
permanent stigmatized status through state-created collateral consequences and
state-endorsed accessibility of a person’s criminal record. This Article contends
that such state action, which sets up obstacles to full reintegration postconviction, is a key factor that gives rise to a state interest in reintegration.
Principles of public safety, economic efficiency, racial equity, and widely shared
moral principles all support the concept that the state that punishes should also
commit itself to reintegration.
Part II then argues that recognition of reintegration as a valid state interest is
already implicit in state statutes that offer three different visions of the state’s
obligation to reintegrate people with convictions. The first presents the
legislative approach: reintegration is integral to the criminal justice system from
arrest to conviction. The second views reintegration as a part of the state’s
executive function: reintegration is a part of the paroling and probation authority
after a conviction is entered. And the third views reintegration as essential to the
22 See infra Part I.C.1; see also Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive State, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 301, 303 (2015).
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state’s role after a person is released, which includes a judiciary function.
Reentry courts and statutes permitting sentencing judges to expunge criminal
records have emerged as a means for the judicial branch to engage in the
reintegration function. Each of these interrelated visions incorporates
reintegration, alongside the state’s interest in punishment, as a necessary
counterpart. These statutes present reintegration as the state’s interest in
balancing reintegration and punishment. The Reintegrative State reinstates a
person’s status lost through conviction, and at the same time protects the public
from recidivism.
Part III identifies reintegrative approaches occurring in discrete phases of the
criminal justice process: 1) before sentencing, 2) at sentencing, and 3) after a
sentence is complete. Part III shows that existing statutory schemes are too
piecemeal, discretionary, and limited. This Part then shows how each phase
informs the reintegrative ideal. The reforms of the Reintegrative State are
grounded in empirical research that shows that the state’s current approach is
not only unjust but also a waste of state resources. The severity of current
obstacles is not only unnecessary to avoid public harm, but can potentially lead
to recidivism. Drawing upon the strengths and weaknesses of these already
existing statutes, Part IV proposes the essential characteristics of the
Reintegrative State and argues that states must adopt a holistic approach of
reintegration that incorporates reintegration intentionally and sequentially
throughout the three phases of the criminal justice system, from arrest to reentry.
I. REINTEGRATION AS A STATE INTEREST
It hardly breaks new ground to assert that the state has an interest in helping
its citizens with convictions to become fully functioning members of society.
What is often obscured, however, is the state’s own role in making it difficult
for that to happen. State action continues to sanction a person long after a
criminal sentence is over through two primary mechanisms: civil consequences
of a conviction and the creation and use of public criminal records as a proxy for
future offending behavior. Both mechanisms are described in more detail in Part
I.B. The state’s continued role post-conviction gives it not just a general interest
in helping people with convictions, but a specific interest in removing those
continuing sanctions when the harm they cause outweighs their benefit. As
discussed in Part IV, to further this interest, the Reintegrative State should
intentionally sequence ways before, at, and after sentencing to mitigate the civil
consequences of a conviction and discrimination based solely on a public
criminal record.
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The state’s interest in reintegration—the restoration of legal rights lost by
function of a criminal conviction—is also supported by commonly recognized
state interests in public safety, equity, efficiency, just punishment, and morality
described in Part I.C. Each rationale shows how reintegration benefits not just
the person with the criminal record, but also society more broadly, especially
under-resourced and minority communities.
Reintegration does not have to be immediate in all cases. Public safety
concerns can dictate an incremental approach that is proportional to the
seriousness of the crime. But for many low-level, non-violent, and first-time
offenders, this process can and should be immediate and need not extend beyond
a person’s criminal sentence. To calibrate the pace of reintegration and
administer it more equitably, the Reintegrative State should draw from much
neglected criminology research discussed below.
This section is divided into three parts that lay a foundation for the need for
state action that reintegrates people with convictions. First, I clarify the
definition of reintegration by explaining what reintegration is not, distinguishing
reintegration from commonly associated concepts of reentry and rehabilitation.
Second, I describe the state action that makes the state’s interest in restoring a
person to a non-criminal status not only apparent but also compelling. Third, and
perhaps most critically, I identify five rationales that further support a state
interest in reintegrating people with convictions.
A. Distinct from Reentry and Rehabilitation
Before describing how state action gives rise to an interest in reintegration, I
want to explain what I mean by reintegration. To begin, I explain first how
reintegration is not reentry or rehabilitation, two words that are often used
interchangeably with reintegration by academics, politicians, and even in state
statutes. Reentry and rehabilitation are consistent with reintegration, but their
focus is on the individual, not the state. Reintegration is a more robust and
comprehensive state goal that requires the state to take action that restores rights
and privileges lost by virtue of a conviction and removes collateral sanctions and
discretionary disabilities.23

23

See infra Part I.A.1–2.
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1. Reentry Focuses on Reality Facing Prisoners; Reintegration Focuses on
the Role of the State
Reintegration is a more robust concept than reentry, although reentry can be
a necessary part of the reintegration process. As a leading scholar in the field,
Jeremy Travis, explains, “[r]eentry is not a form of supervision, like parole.
Reentry is not a goal, like rehabilitation or reintegration. Reentry is not an
option.”24 Reentry is merely the “process of leaving prison and returning to
society.”25 The vast majority of people who are incarcerated will return to
society whether or not they are reintegrated back into their communities socially,
politically, or economically.26
In other words, reentry is simply a statement of the prison reality that the
United States faces today.27 Over 600,000 prisoners are released nationally each
year, a reality that states need to address.28 But a reentry focus does little to
address how states should respond or whether the state has any obligation to
those released.
Second, federal and state reentry initiatives focus exclusively on people
returning home from prison.29 They highlight a need for state action only at the
back end of the criminal justice process, after people have served their time in
prison. Reentry overlooks that a criminal record creates significant legal
obstacles, even if a person spends no time in jail or prison.30
Indeed, released prisoners are only a fraction of the people with criminal
convictions. Reentry does not account for the 850,000 people estimated to be on
parole, the “staggering—and growing—3.9 million people on probation,” or the
“over 11 million people cycl[ing] through local jails each year.”31
Reintegration, on the other hand, centers the state’s responsibility for the
entry of a conviction onto a public criminal record and the resulting collateral

24

JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY, at xxi

(2005).
25

Id.
PETERSILIA, supra note 6, at 3.
27 See TRAVIS, supra note 24, at xxi–xxii (describing the differences between reentry and reintegration and
rehabilitation).
28 Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2015, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE
(Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2015.html.
29 TRAVIS, supra note 24, at xxii.
30 See infra Part I.B.
31 Wagner & Rabuy, supra note 28 (emphasis omitted).
26
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consequences. The goal of the Reintegrative State is to respond to the reality that
all people with criminal convictions, whether they have served time, whether the
convictions are minor or severe, whether there is one conviction or many, suffer
a social, political, and economic stigma created or permitted by the state.32
2. Rehabilitation Focuses on the Person; Reintegration Focuses on the
State
Unlike reentry, rehabilitation describes a goal, and not just the reality that a
person in prison is most likely at some point coming home. Rehabilitation, like
reintegration, can require the state to act or to fund services, therapy, or
programming to treat and reform a person with a conviction. So the goal of
rehabilitation in the broad sense is not necessarily inconsistent with
reintegration—but the focus of rehabilitation is on the individual with a
conviction and the individual’s need to reform from criminal behaviors. As
discussed below, rehabilitation historically does not require the state to
“rehabilitate” a person’s legal status as well, removing or reducing collateral
consequences in the way that reintegration does.
During the 1960s and 1970s, states endorsed a rehabilitative ideal as an
integral part of the criminal justice system.33 A person’s status as an “offender”
created a state obligation to treat and to rehabilitate.34 This approach viewed
prisons as a place of correction and reform, and states funded social-service
programs aimed at changing people through therapy or building social
capacity.35 Frontline caseworkers in prisons and parole and probation offices
were required to have social work training to help “correct” or rehabilitate
offenders.36 That goal was signaled even in the name given to many prisons in
that era—the Department of Corrections. California and Ohio, for example, have
the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections. Prisons were expensive
institutions with a lot of programing to prepare people for release, and parole

32 See Maya Rhodan, A Misdemeanor Conviction Is Not a Big Deal, Right? Think Again, TIME (Apr. 24,
2014) (“‘The single most dangerous thing people think is that if they get a conviction and don’t go to jail they
won’t face issues . . . .’ And yet, misdemeanor convictions can trigger the same legal hindrances, known as
collateral consequences, as felonies.”).
33 See Sarah Glazer, Sentencing Reform, 24 CQ RESEARCHER 27, 30–31 (2014), http://library.cqpress.
com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre2014011000.
34 See Glazer, supra note 33, at 33 (discussing the attempt to eliminate the root causes of crime, like
poverty, by giving offenders jobs and education).
35 TONY WARD & SHADD MARUNA, REHABILITATION: BEYOND THE RISK PARADIGM 8 (2007).
36 See id. at 23.
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and probation officers had low caseloads.37 Parole and probation officers were
seen as agents of change, not policing authorities as they are now.38
The rehabilitative ideal was, rightly or wrongly, seen as a failed endeavor,39
which reversed the role of prisons and paroling authorities. A now-infamous
article by Robert Martinson in 197440 purported to analyze the outcomes of 231
studies to determine the effectiveness of rehabilitative programs on reducing
recidivism.41 As reported in numerous press accounts, he concluded that
“nothing” works.42 Although Martinson ultimately recanted this conclusion,43
and the committee he worked with presented a more nuanced result, he became
the leader “among a series of critiques from the political Left, Right and Center
that helped to usher in an era of ‘nothing works’ pessimism and ‘lock ’em up’
punitiveness.”44 The criminal justice policies of the 1980s and 1990s focused on
incapacitation and retribution to guide sentencing principles.45 And while
funding for rehabilitation efforts decreased with significantly fewer programs
offered to prisoners during those decades, collateral consequences statutes
increased exponentially during the era of the “tough-on-crime” politics in the
’80s and ’90s.
Rehabilitation as a state interest resurfaces at times in reentry discourse. It is
worth noting, though, that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and the
Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Adult Offenders, both in Article 1,
continue to adhere to rehabilitation as a goal.46 And many states are a party to
those agreements.47 But rehabilitation efforts are expensive, and both sides of

37

LEANNE FIFTAL ALARID & ROLANDO V. DEL CARMEN, COMMUNITY-BASED CORRECTIONS 90 (8th ed.

2011).
38

Id.
See, e.g., Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT.
22 (1974).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 24–25.
42 Id. at 48–49.
43 Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. 243, 254 (1979).
44 WARD & MARUNA, supra note 35, at 8; see also DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME
AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 69, 71, 73 (2001).
45 GARLAND, supra note 44, at 72.
46 Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. No. 91-538, § 2, 84 Stat. 1397, 1397 (1970); INTERSTATE
COMPACT FOR THE SUPERVISION OF ADULT OFFENDERS, art. I (INTERSTATE COMM’N FOR ADULT OFFENDER
SUPERVISION 1998).
47 Agreement on Detainers, NAT’L CTR. FOR INTERSTATE COMPACTS, http://apps.csg.org/ncic/Compact.
aspx?id=1 (last visited Feb. 23, 2017); Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, NAT’L CTR. FOR
INTERSTATE COMPACTS, http://apps.csg.org/ncic/Compact.aspx?id=70 (last visited Feb. 23, 2017).
39
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the political aisle still seem skeptical of rehabilitation. And the state’s obligation
to rehabilitate or “fix” a person limits the state’s role to a social work model that
does not remove the legal and political obstacles erected by state statutes.
Reintegration is not inconsistent with the goal of rehabilitation in a broad
sense. Both want to structure the penal system and release in a way that helps
people make it, without reoffending, once they are finished with their criminal
sentence. But the focus of reintegration differs in a significant way. It does not
look to “reform” people with convictions because they have some inherently bad
character or lack of employable skills. Rather, the focus of the Reintegrative
State is to restore a person with a criminal conviction to the person’s preconviction legal status to the extent possible by removing legal barriers created
by the state.
B. State Action Creating a Permanent Second Class Status Based on
Conviction
At the Congressional hearings for the Second Chance Act, Calvin Moore, a
man with multiple convictions, testified that he was finding it impossible to get
a job with a criminal record: “In short, the decisions that I made 30 plus years
ago—and that I have already paid for—are still preventing me from moving
forward and getting a second chance.”48 Scholars have characterized the impact
of a conviction that Calvin Moore describes as a second-class status, endorsed
by the state specifically through statutes that allow automatic or discretionary
civil legal sanctions based on a conviction and more generally through the public
proliferation of the criminal records.49
Many justifications have been offered for this reduced status. First, the
person’s criminal act was voluntary. Second, their criminal behavior implicates
their moral character. Third, their unlawful conduct makes them deserving of
reduced status because convictions are strong indicators of reoffending.50 And
relatedly, there is a strong state interest in keeping the public safe from future
harm by people who have violated the law.51 People, by virtue of past criminal

48 Barriers to Reentry for Ex-Convicts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security, 111th Cong. 45 (2010) (statement of Calvin Moore, D.C. Employment Justice Center).
49 Demleitner, supra note 18, at 154, 158–59 (“Their exclusion from the labor market and additional
burdens imposed upon them have led to their status as outcasts.”).
50 Paul Gendreau, Tracy Little & Claire Goggin, A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender
Recidivism: What Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 576 (1996).
51 See infra Part II.C.
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conduct, are seen as having “immutable and essentially flawed natures.”52 A
criminal underclass status is also perpetuated by the many “societal pressures to
maintain a distance between ‘us’ and ‘them.’”53 Even the nomenclature used to
describe people with convictions underscores this point. In public and academic
discourse alike, people with criminal convictions are referred to as ex-offenders,
ex-convicts, deviants, incorrigibles, superpredators, or career criminals.54 All of
these terms permanently label people with criminal records as unredeemable
long after their criminal sentences have been served.55
The stigma facing people with convictions goes beyond the use of words.
State obstacles to reintegration exemplify what sociologist John Braithwaite
considers counterproductive stigmatic shaming.56 Braithwaite argues that there
is and always has been a place for shaming in the criminal justice system.57 The
ritualistic stages leading to conviction—arrest, incarceration, arraignment, trial
or plea, conviction, and sentencing—engage all of the participants in the
criminal justice system—judge, prosecutor, defendant, defense attorney, and the
public—in shaming. From arrest and booking to public arraignment and trial to
sentencing and incarceration, individuals participate in certain negative, punitive
rituals that mark their entry into the criminal justice system. The system is
careful to document this process from the initial arrest or citation to the final
execution on a rap sheet. Yet, once released from the system, no reintegrative
ritual takes place. No public documentation or public ceremony acknowledges
a person’s exit from the system and reintegration to full citizenship, as though
there is no way to remove the criminal stigma.
The initial process of public shaming which has been a part of criminal
punishment throughout time is not in and of itself bad. But Braithwaite argues
that the current model of stigmatic shaming “creates outcasts, where ‘criminal’

52

SHADD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: HOW EX-CONVICTS REFORM AND REBUILD THEIR LIVES 4 (2001).
TRAVIS, supra note 24, at 250.
54 GARLAND, supra note 44, at 42–44 (describing the rise of the “delinquent,” “criminal character,” and
“psychopathic offender”); MARUNA, supra note 52, at 4 (describing how people with convictions are referred to
as “superpredators,” “career criminals,” and “incorrigibles”).
55 JACOBS, supra note 10, at 4 (“A criminal record is for life . . . .”); TRAVIS, supra note 24, at xxvi; Gabriel
J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789,
1799 (2012) (“Every conviction implies a permanent change, because these disabilities will ‘carry through
life.’”).
56 See John Braithwaite, Shame and Modernity, 33 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (1993).
57 See id.
53
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becomes a master status trait that drives out all other identities.”58 This process
of public shaming stands in sharp contrast to what Braithwaite calls
“reintegrative shaming,” which “is disapproval dispensed with an ongoing
relationship with the offender based on respect, shaming which focuses on the
evil of the deed rather than on the offender as an irremediably evil person.”59
Although this Article focuses on the state’s role in generating and mitigating
the legally endorsed stigma created by a conviction, the stigma facing those with
a criminal history does not derive solely from the state. Convictions create a
social and economic stigma as well.60 Socially, people look up the criminal
history of neighbors, babysitters, and even dating prospects because of the
inferences that they assume can be drawn from a person’s criminal past.
Economically, potential employers pull criminal records to help them make
hiring decisions. They may fear that a record exposes them to negligence-inhiring suits. Even where state laws protect employers from these suits and forbid
employers from denying applications based on a conviction alone, an employer
still can reject applicants if their criminal offenses are “directly related” to the
job sought.61 Our culture, beyond the action of the state, views a criminal record
as more than just an “evil deed,” as Braithwaite suggests, but as a sign of a
person’s bad character and propensity to reoffend, which is inherent and largely
unredeemable.
The role convictions play in our culture also differs from that role in other
countries. For example, in Spain, criminal convictions are not public.62
Defendants are anonymous in court decisions, which only use a defendant’s
initials, similar to how court cases for juveniles are reported in the United
States.63 The identity of the defendant is protected, and the criminal sentence
suffices to punish a person for a crime.64 No post-conviction civil consequences
deprive people of rights or benefits after their time is served, and no publically
retrievable record exists.65 Privacy prevails over public access, and access is

58 Id.; GARLAND, supra note 44, at 9 (“Forms of public shaming and humiliation that for decades have
been regarded as obsolete and excessively demeaning are valued by their political proponents today precisely
because of their unambiguously punitive character.”).
59 Braithwaite, supra note 56, at 1.
60 Christopher Uggen & Robert Stewart, Piling On: Collateral Consequences and Community Supervision,
99 MINN. L. REV. 1871, 1889–90 (2015).
61 See infra Part III.
62 JACOBS, supra note 10, at 164.
63 See id.
64 See id. at 169.
65 Id. at 172.
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viewed as an obstacle to employment, and therefore, access to criminal histories
would be counterproductive because it would impede successful reintegration.66
Spain’s approach highlights the critical role the state can play in shaping the
cultural understanding of convictions and the accessibility of criminal records.
The centrality of the state’s role suggests that, if our cultural perception of a
person’s conviction status is to be changed, the state also needs to play a role,
and even take the lead, in removing the criminal stigma. Reintegrative
approaches would undo or reduce legal stigma created by collateral
consequences, which is a product of state action. For some people with records,
depending on the dangerousness of the offense, the state could ensure that
collateral consequences are either not triggered at all, or if they are triggered,
that they are related to or proportionate to the criminal act. For minor, nonviolent offenses, the state could determine that the conviction record should not
be made public; for others, the state could prohibit discriminatory “criminal”
inferences that can be drawn from viewing a person’s criminal record after a
certain period of good conduct post-sentence. Without such rational processes
for balancing the state’s interests in reintegration and protecting the public from
future harm, people with convictions are essentially placed in what one scholar
termed “internal exile.”67 An exile is currently legally sanctioned by the state
through dozens of post-conviction, civil collateral sanctions triggered by a
conviction, and the unfettered dissemination of the public criminal record itself.
The two primary examples of stigmatizing state action are the subject of the next
two subsections.
1. Impact of State Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualifications
As early as colonial times, legislatures passed laws “denying convicted
offenders the right to enter into contracts, automatically dissolving their
marriages, and barring them from a wide variety of jobs and benefits.”68 As part
of the post-Civil War Reconstruction Amendments, the Fourteenth Amendment
permitted states to deny the right to vote to those who participated “in rebellion,

66 For a more direct comparison of Spain and the United States, see James B. Jacobs & Elena Larrauri, Are
Criminal Convictions a Public Matter? The USA and Spain, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 3 (2012).
67 Demleitner, supra note 18, at 153–54; see also ABA COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS &
PUB. DEF. SERV. FOR D.C., INTERNAL EXILE: COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION IN FEDERAL LAWS
AND REGULATIONS (2009) [hereinafter INTERNAL EXILE], http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/cecs/internalexile.authcheckdam.pdf.
68 Travis, supra note 12, at 17–18.
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or other crime.”69 Civil hurdles upon release from prison are not new, but the
scope of today’s problem is.70
Legal scholars,71 as well as countless ABA and state bar association
reports,72 have identified the wide-range of civil consequences facing people
with criminal convictions. For example, a college student convicted of a drug
possession misdemeanor who completed a sentence of six months of probation
may be refused financial aid, and a homeless person convicted of public
intoxication may be denied a single occupancy public housing unit. Both refusals
are triggered and permitted or required by state law.
According to a 2003 ABA report, collateral consequences take two forms:
(1) collateral sanctions, and (2) discretionary disqualifications.73 A collateral
sanction is “a legal penalty, disability or disadvantage . . . imposed on a person
automatically upon that person’s conviction for a felony, misdemeanor or other
offense, even if it is not included in the sentence.”74 A discretionary
disqualification is a “penalty, disability, or disadvantage . . . that a civil court,
administrative agency, or official is authorized but not required to impose on a
person convicted of an offense on grounds related to the conviction.”75 These
consequences are legal disabilities that occur “by operation of law” because of
a conviction, but are not part of the sentence for the crime.76 Since the tough-oncrime criminal justice era, these state and federal statutes have exponentially
increased77 and are viewed as continuing to punish people well after their formal
criminal sentences are over.78 These laws have been characterized by many

69 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also PIPPA HOLLOWAY, FELON DISFRANCHISEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 2 (2014).
70 Margaret Colgate Love, The Debt that Can Never Be Repaid: A Report Card on the Collateral
Consequences of Conviction, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2006, at 16, 17 (describing the “growing appreciation of the role
of legal barriers in frustrating offender reentry”).
71 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 6.
72 E.g., 2007 COLLATERAL SANCTIONS COMM., MINN. LEGISLATURE, CRIMINAL RECORDS AND
EMPLOYMENT IN MINNESOTA (2008), http://archive.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2008/mandated/080082.pdf; INTERNAL
EXILE, supra note 67; N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, RE-ENTRY AND REINTEGRATION: THE ROAD TO PUBLIC SAFETY
(2006), https://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=26857.
73 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 1.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Travis, supra note 12, at 16; see also Pinard, supra note 12, at 624 n.1; Pinard & Thompson, supra note
12, at 586; Thompson, supra note 18, at 258.
77 Pinard & Thompson, supra note 12, at 587–88 (noting that “the last two decades have witnessed the[]
dramatic expansion” of such civil punishments, which can be linked to the “tough on crime” and “war on drugs”
movements).
78 PETERSILIA, supra note 6, at 9; Thompson, supra note 6, at 80; Travis, supra note 12, at 16–17.
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different names—collateral consequences, invisible punishments, internal
exile,79 civil death,80 and civil sanctions.81
For people with convictions, these civil consequences are anything but
collateral and are often more severe than the criminal sanction itself.82 For
example, a misdemeanor for shoplifting that results in a criminal sentence of two
days of community service can have more traumatic results after the sentence is
over if the defendant is a parent in public housing who is evicted. A barber
convicted of an aggravated assault felony who serves ten years in prison with
good behavior can be denied a barber’s license by the state when released on
parole. These are examples of how state statutes continue punishment and, taken
as a whole, create a new status post-conviction created by collateral sanctions
and discretionary disqualifications, which are not disclosed when a person is
sentenced and are not considered a part of criminal punishment.
The increase in these “invisible punishments” has been so dramatic that few
states have an exhaustive list of their own laws.83 This fact prompted the
American Bar Association, in collaboration with George Washington
University, to develop a comprehensive, searchable website that catalogues the
48,229 civil statutes in every state and the four U.S. territories.84 The numbers,
at a glance, are striking—873 state statutes create barriers to reintegration in
Mississippi; 1201 in Florida; 1314 in New York; and 1831 in California.85
Perhaps, the most significant examples of a state-created, second-class status
are laws that deny people with convictions the right to engage fully as political
participants after their convictions. These laws deny people the right to vote,86

79

Demleitner, supra note 18; INTERNAL EXILE, supra note 67.
Chin, supra note 55, at 1790.
81 See MARUNA, supra note 52, at 5; Travis, supra note 12, at 16.
82 Pinard & Thompson, supra note 12, at 590 (“[C]ollateral consequences . . . often outlast the direct
sentences imposed on defendants.”).
83 Florida, Ohio, and North Carolina have catalogued their statutes. MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY
ROBERTS & CECELIA KLINGELE, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY, &
PRACTICE app. A (2013); see also NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, COLLATERAL DAMAGE:
AMERICA’S FAILURE TO FORGIVE OR FORGET IN THE WAR ON CRIME 30 (2014), https://www.nacdl.org/
restoration/roadmapreport/.
84 National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR.
[hereinafter National Inventory], https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2017) (follow arrow
hyperlink; then click “Search Multiple Jurisdictions”).
85 Id. (follow arrow hyperlink; then select Mississippi, Florida, New York, or California).
86 Gabriel J. Chin, Felon Disenfranchisement and Democracy in the Late Jim Crow Era, 5 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 329, 330 (2007).
80
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hold public office,87 or sit on juries,88 making them partial citizens.89 One in
forty-one adults in the United States—five million citizens—have “currently or
permanently lost their voting rights as a result of a felony conviction.”90 And
these laws disproportionately impact the poor and people of color: 7.7% of black
adults have lost their rights to vote, four times the national average.91
State and federal statutes create barriers to reentry in the areas of life that are
most critical to successful reintegration—family reunification, employment, and
housing. Some of the most numerous and counterproductive barriers to
reintegration are employment-related. State agencies throughout the country
have the discretion to deny or revoke employment licenses in hundreds of
industries because of a person’s criminal history. For example, if a person has a
security guard license and is arrested for a class A misdemeanor in New York,
the arrest alone can prompt notice to the licensing agency that results in a license
suspension.92 Even if a person is convicted of a class A misdemeanor, does that
necessarily mean there is a relationship between the offense and the employment
such that the person is incapable of working as a security guard? For many states,
the answer is yes.
This section does not attempt to catalogue all of the ways that state and
federal legislation has created a second-class status for people with convictions.
Numerous scholars have written extensively about this topic.93 This section
simply argues that the state creates a range of civil legal obstacles postconviction that make reintegration more difficult, if not impossible.

87 Andrea Steinacker, Note, The Prisoner’s Campaign: Felony Disenfranchisement Laws and the Right to
Hold Public Office, 2003 BYU L. REV. 801, 804–08.
88 Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the Basis of Criminal Convictions, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 592, 593 (2013).
89 Chin, supra note 86, at 330; ERIKA WOOD, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RESTORING THE RIGHT TO VOTE
1 (2009), http://brennan.3cdn.net/8782cc82daf02b9431_29m6ibzbu.pdf; see also RYAN S. KING, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, A DECADE OF REFORM: FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
1 (2006), http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/FVR_Decade_Reform.pdf; THE SENTENCING PROJECT &
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (1998).
90 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT (2014), http://www.
sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Felony-Disenfranchisement-Laws-in-the-US.pdf.
91 Id.
92 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 89-l(4)(a) (McKinney 2012).
93 See sources cited supra note 6.
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2. Impact of the Permanent Criminal Record
Originally, a criminal record, more colloquially known as a “rap sheet,” was
created “by and for the police.”94 Law enforcement agencies developed and
maintained their own local systems of record keeping. State systems
coordinating information from local agencies did not exist until the 1930s,95 and
the massive shift in computerizing and sharing criminal histories nationally did
not occur until the 1960s.96
After the creation of a searchable national system of criminal records, the
FBI denied access to “non-law enforcement agencies” until Congress, in the
1970s, allowed FBI background checks to be disseminated to certain industries,
like banks, security regulators, child-care services, and housing authorities.97
States eventually followed suit, expanding the categories of people who could
buy FBI criminal records exponentially.98 But these background checks were not
immediately retrievable, because they required fingerprints taken by the police
or “certified private compan[ies].”99
Criminal court records, on the other hand, were always accessible to the
public in theory, but rarely retrieved in practice.100 It was prohibitively timeconsuming until states started to centralize the records in electronic databases.101
Over the past couple of decades this reality has changed. States began selling
daily court dockets to online companies or offering them by bulk download.102
Connecticut requires an annual subscription and provides monthly updates.103
Some of the twenty-six states with unified, electronic state criminal record
systems have online searchable databases that only require a name or
identification number.104 At least thirteen states make rap sheets accessible
94 JACOBS, supra note 10, at 38 (including a discussion of the history of the “rap sheet” and the evolution
of the publically accessible criminal record).
95 Id. at 41.
96 Id. at 4041 (explaining the origins of the “nationally integrated system for sharing individual criminal
history information” that assigned “state criminal record repositories primary responsibility for collecting and
maintaining . . . information” and enabled “states to access each other’s criminal record databases”).
97 Id. at 43.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 4546.
100 Id. at 56.
101 Id. (noting that only twenty-six states have unified court systems with statewide searchable databases).
102 Id. at 58.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 57–58. There is a danger of misidentification with requiring so little information to pull criminal
information. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., BROKEN RECORDS: HOW ERRORS BY CRIMINAL BACKGROUND
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online.105 In Kansas, for example, for only $20, a person can purchase a criminal
record.106 With the advent of the Internet, the accessibility of public records
expanded significantly.107 Searchable private online databases number
potentially in the thousands and sell all kinds of court records, including criminal
histories, inexpensively.108
Because of their original purpose, criminal records often include coding and
jargon meant for law enforcement, making it difficult for laypeople to decipher
the charges and, ultimately, the disposition in a case.109 Records can be
inaccurate or incomplete, making these documents less than ideal for employers,
landlords, or other private actors to understand and rely on.
A critical problem for reintegration purposes is that these databases may not
be updated to remove expunged or sealed records.110 Some companies charge
over $399 to remove “mug shots” taken at arrest and to correct for expunged
records.111
Although employment has been correlated with lowering recidivism rates,112
studies show that the accessibility of the public criminal record significantly
hurts a person’s employment chances. One study found that 86% of companies
conduct criminal background checks on some applicants and 69% conduct

CHECKING COMPANIES HARM WORKERS AND BUSINESSES 6, 15 (2012), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/prreports/broken-records-report.pdf.
105 Id. at 51.
106 Id.
107 James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal Records, 11
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 186 (2008).
108 Id.; SEARCH, NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUSTICE INFO. & STATISTICS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASK
FORCE ON THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RECORD INFORMATION 7 (2005), http://www.search.
org/files/pdf/RNTFCSCJRI.pdf; see also Binyamin Appelbaum, Out of Trouble, but Criminal Records Keep
Men Out of Work, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/01/business/out-of-troublebut-criminal-records-keep-men-out-of-work.html?_r=0.
109 JACOBS, supra note 10, at 47–48.
110 JACOBS, supra note 10, at 131; Margaret Colgate Love, Expungement of Criminal Records: “The Big
Lie”, CRIME REP. (June 23, 2011), http://www.thecrimereport.org/viewpoints/2011-06-expungement-ofcriminal-records-the-big-lie; Joy Radice, Administering Justice: Removing Statutory Barriers to Reentry, 83 U.
COLO. L. REV. 715, 750 (2012) (“A growing industry of private companies that conduct background checks
purchase and store criminal records in their databases without any mechanism for removing expunged records.”);
Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 321, 345.
111 Uggen & Stewart, supra note 60, at 189091 (“Even the simplest interaction with the justice system can
therefore result in an indefinite, if not permanent, online posting of one’s photograph and charges.”).
112 Christopher Uggen, Sara Wakefield & Bruce Western, Work and Family Perspectives on Reentry, in
PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 209, 211–15 (Jeremy Travis & Christy Visher eds., 2005).
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criminal background checks on all applicants.113 And research shows that a
person is at least 50% less likely to receive even a callback for an interview if
the employer knows about a felony conviction.114 That number increases if the
person with the record is African-American.115
The explosion of criminal records may come at a real cost nationally.116
Given the number of people with records and their difficulty finding
employment, one study estimated that the economy in 2008 lost 1.5 to 1.7
million employees.117 Another study shows the impact of incarceration on
poverty levels, estimating that poverty would have declined by 20%.118
In sum, over the past fifty years, federal and state action has increased the
proliferation of the eternal criminal record.119 The accessibility of inexpensive
criminal records is an obstacle to reintegration. It has incentivized employers,
landlords, and even private individuals to pull a person’s criminal history as an
indicator of their risk of future offending and moral character. But in comparison
to a credit report that monitors actions and financial behavior over time to
indicate financial risk, a criminal history is merely a jumble of codes, at times
inaccurate, that tells a person nothing about how the information on the report
relates to risk.120
C. Rationales Supporting Reintegration
The state’s interest in reintegration does not rest solely on the state’s own
role in creating civil consequences for convictions and disseminating criminal
records. That interest is supported by five rationales that draw on state interests
and values that are already well established. These rationales also suggest that
the state does not have to choose between helping people with records and

113 SHRM Finds Fewer Employers Using Background Checks in Hiring, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCES
MGMT. (July 19, 2012), https://www.shrm.org/about-shrm/press-room/press-releases/pages/backgroundchecks.
aspx; see also JACOBS, supra note 10, at 6.
114 See Jenny Roberts, supra note 114, at 331.
115 Id.; see also infra Part I.C.
116 Roberts, supra note 114, at 333 (“[I]t [i]s surprising ‘how little people know about [the economic impact
of a criminal record] and how little it gets talked about in terms of anti-poverty.’” (quoting Gary Fields, Retiree’s
Phantom Arrest Record Is Finally Expunged, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/retireesphantom-arrest-record-is-finally-expunged-1417478846)).
117 Id. at 332 n.63.
118 Id. at 332.
119 See JACOBS, supra note 10, at 4.
120 See id. at 74 (analogizing a criminal record to a credit report).
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protecting the safety of the community at large. A sound reintegration strategy
can accomplish both.
1. Public Safety Rationale
A tension does exist between the state’s interest in reintegrating a person
with a conviction and the state’s interest in protecting the public from future
harm. After all, no one contends that a person’s criminal past never has bearing
on his or her conduct in the future. At the same time, few would dispute that
state action that unnecessarily hinders reintegration actually undermines public
safety by increasing the risk of recidivism. The Reintegrative State can alleviate
this tension by taking into account the research of criminologists who study
which criminal records predict future criminal behavior. This research finds that
the vast majority of people with records stop committing crimes, that factors like
age and employment matter, and that after six to ten years, most people with
convictions are no more likely to commit a crime than those who have no
criminal history. Those findings suggest that treating all convictions and all
defendants the same imposes significant social costs without any corresponding
benefit.
A virtually undisputed finding in criminology is that people age out of
crime.121 Experts who study desistance,122 the process by which people stop
committing crime,123 calculate that 85% of people will age out of criminal
behavior by the time they are twenty-eight years old.124 The classic arc of
criminal activity, especially for crimes like petty theft, robbery, or drug dealing,
is that people begin offending in their teens, continue through late adolescence,
and stop by the time they are thirty years old.125
In one line of desistence research, criminologists argue that the “age-crime
curve” drives most of desistence, and it has been “unchanged for at least 150

121

See, e.g., MARUNA, supra note 52, at 20.
Shawn D. Bushway et al., An Empirical Framework for Studying Desistance as a Process, 39
CRIMINOLOGY 491, 492 (2001) (describing desistence as the process by which people arrive at a state of nonoffending); see also MARUNA, supra note 52, at 6–7 (explaining that desistence from crime is “the process by
which stigmatized, former offenders are able to ‘make good’ and create new lives for themselves”).
123 See WARD & MARUNA, supra note 35, at 4.
124 Id. at 13; see also Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread
Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 331 (2009).
125 MARUNA, supra note 52, at 20. For a description of the literature covering the life-course conceptions
of criminal behavior, see Christopher Uggen, Work as a Turning Point in the Life Course of Criminals: A
Duration Model of Age, Employment, and Recidivism, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 529, 530 (2000).
122
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years.”126 Looking at crime trajectories of delinquent boys followed from age
seven to seventy, Sampson and Laub showed that “crime declines with age even
for active offenders,” refuting arguments in the literature that repeat offenders
never desist from crime.127 In fact, new evidence shows that a significant number
desist quickly after their last conviction.128
In addition to age, life changes, like employment and marriage, are
significant predictors of desisting from crime.129 In fact, research supports that
desistence and the “successful reintegration of these (mostly) men depends in
part on their ability to find and maintain gainful employment.”130 One study
showed that people twenty-seven years old or older with criminal records were
less likely to be rearrested and reconvicted “when provided with marginal
employment opportunities” than similarly situated people with prior convictions
who were not employed.131
Recent studies about the impact of employment reentry programs show that
participants who enroll within three months of release from prison present a
decline in recidivism.132 Another recent study compared people with extensive
criminal histories who completed a job reentry program, Center for Employment
Opportunities (CEO), in New York City with people who dropped out.133 The
evidence showed that completers had “much better employment outcomes than
CEO noncompleters in years two and three of the follow-up period.”134 The
researchers concluded that employers could use program completion as a signal
of desistence.135
126 MARUNA, supra note 52, at 20; see also Michael Gottfredson & Travis Hirschi, The True Value of
Lambda Would Appear to Be Zero: An Essay on Career Criminals, Criminal Careers, Selective Incapacitation,
Cohort Studies, and Related Topics, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 213 (1986) (arguing that data shows even people with
extensive criminal histories desist as they age).
127 Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, Life-Course Desisters? Trajectories of Crime Among Delinquent
Boys Followed to Age 70, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 555, 585 (2003).
128 Shawn D. Bushway & Robert Apel, A Signaling Perspective on Employment-Based Reentry
Programming, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 21, 39 (2012).
129 Bushway & Apel, supra note 128; Uggen, Wakefield & Western, supra note 112, at 215–16.
130 Michael A. Stoll & Shawn D. Bushway, The Effect of Criminal Background Checks on Hiring ExOffenders, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 371, 372 (2008); see also JEREMY TRAVIS, AMY L. SOLOMON &
MICHELLE WAUL, URBAN INST., FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER
REENTRY 31–34 (2001), http://research.urban.org/UploadedPDF/from_prison_to_home.pdf; Shawn Bushway &
Peter Reuter, Labor Markets and Crime Risk Factors, in PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T,
WHAT’S PROMISING 6-1, 6-3 (1997).
131 Uggen, supra note 125, at 529, 542.
132 Bushway & Apel, supra note 128, at 38.
133 Id. at 36.
134 Id. at 23.
135 Id. at 36.
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Studies about recidivism, not desistence, are often the ones cited when
politicians talk about the state’s interest in public safety, because data
consistently show that people with criminal records have a high probability of
reoffending, and much of that reoffending occurs within the first three years after
release.136 More recent recidivism studies, though, take a more nuanced
approach by looking at the timing of future offenses to show that the probability
of reoffense decreases as time passes. For example, a study of 962 people
convicted of felonies in New Jersey shows that the 50% who were arrested again
were rearrested within 2.2 years of the prior offense.137 Thirty percent of the 962
people were not rearrested over the course of twenty years.138
Another related line of recidivism research shows that, on average, after
seven to ten years without committing a new offense, a person with a criminal
record is no more likely to be convicted of a crime than someone who never had
a criminal history.139 Using longitudinal data of eighteen-year-olds first arrested
in 1980 and hazard rates, Blumstein and Nakamura compared a group of
eighteen-year-olds with arrest histories to one sample of eighteen-year-olds in
the general population and another sample of eighteen-year-olds who were never
arrested.140 Hazard rates measure the probability over time that someone who
“has stayed clean will be arrested.”141 Looking at the hazard rates of these groups
over time, the researchers examined when the group with arrests posed no more
risk for a new arrest than their never-arrested counterparts.142 They looked at
rates separately for robbery, aggravated assault, and burglary to see whether the
rates of redemption differed based on the type of crime.143 Those arrested for
robbery began to look like their never-arrested counterparts in 7.7 years; those

136 Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 124, at 331 (“Two studies that tracked released U.S. prisoners show
that of all those who were rearrested in the first 3 years, approximately two thirds were arrested in the first year,
which indicates the declining recidivism rate over time.”).
137 Id. (citing DON M. GOTTFREDSON, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, NO. NCJ 178889, EFFECTS OF JUDGES’
SENTENCING DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL CAREERS 4 (1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178889.pdf).
138 Id.
139 Shawn D. Bushway, Paul Nieuwbeerta & Arjan Blokland, The Predictive Value of Criminal Background
Checks: Do Age and Criminal History Affect Time to Redemption?, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 33 (2011) (“Offenders
do eventually look like nonoffenders, usually after a spell of between 7 and 10 years of nonoffending.”).
140 Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 124, at 34950.
141 Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, ‘Redemption’ in an Era of Widespread Criminal Background
Checks, 263 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 10, 12 (2009), http://www.communityalternatives.org/pdf/employers/NIJBlumstein-Nakamora-relevance-of-remote-conviction.pdf.
142 Id.
143 Id.
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arrested for aggravated assault looked the same after 4.3 years; and those
arrested for burglary looked the same after only 3.8 years.144
The findings from a different study looking at a wider age range of people
with convictions supported Blumstein and Nakamura’s results.145 A study
conducted by Bushway and colleagues showed that young people with one
offense were no more likely than their non-offending counterparts to be
convicted of a new crime after ten years; first offenders over forty required only
two years of no new offenses to look like the control group with no criminal
history; people with one to three convictions converge with non-offenders
around thirteen years; and people with four or more convictions converge at the
earliest after twenty-three years.146 This new body of research challenges
inferences that all convictions predict future criminal behavior equally. It creates
“an opportunity to think about when an ex-offender might be ‘redeemed’ for
employment purposes—that is, when his or her criminal record empirically may
be shown to be irrelevant as a factor in a hiring decision.”147
More broadly, the research on desistence and recidivism shows that not all
people with criminal records create the same level of risk, so they do not fit a
one-size-fits-all policy approach.148 And creating unnecessary obstacles to
employment could actually contribute to recidivism rates.149 Criminologists
have long argued that criminal justice policies do not account for what we know
about people who commit crimes.150 This research supports a more nuanced
approach to civil sanctions and disqualifications. A criminal record alone should
not serve as an automatic and permanent predictor of future criminal conduct.
2. Just Punishment Rationale
From the perspective of punishment theory, civil consequences of a
conviction are not just. Even under the most retributivist theory, just punishment
must be proportionate to the criminal act, the defendant must have notice of the
punishment, and the punishment, except in the extreme cases of a life sentence

144

Id.
Bushway, Nieuwbeerta & Blokland, supra note 139, at 52.
146 Id.
147 Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 141, at 14.
148 Bushway, Nieuwbeerta & Blokland, supra note 139, at 52.
149 Id. at 56 (“[I]f offenders are banned [from jobs] and find that their conventional opportunities are
blocked, then they might become more likely to recidivate.”).
150 See Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence, 100 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 765, 766 (2010).
145
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or the death penalty, must have finality.151 Many civil consequences lack all
three characteristics.152
Civil sanctions and discretionary disqualifications are not designed to be
proportionate to the criminal offense that triggers them. They are imposed based
on the existence of a felony or misdemeanor conviction, regardless of the nature
or circumstances of the offense.153 The only degree of proportionality that exists
is that more sanctions apply to felony convictions than misdemeanors.154
Proportionality is most problematic for defendants charged with
misdemeanors and low-level, non-violent felony offenses. The legal system
views most misdemeanors as “petty offenses,”155 and punishment is minor.156
People rarely serve time in jail, which under federal statute cannot exceed six
months and under state statutes is not more than a year. Similarly, the sentencing
range for low-level felonies is not severe, especially for someone without prior
convictions.157 For these defendants, the conviction on their public record
becomes the most significant part of criminal punishment because the criminal
record can last a lifetime, and triggers hundreds of discretionary civil sanctions
that bear no direct relationship to the criminal act.158
Florida, for example, has 1201 statutes catalogued in the National Inventory
of Collateral Consequences of Conviction.159 Of these civil sanctions, 532 are
automatic and mandatory when a conviction is entered, and 507 are
discretionary; 268 apply to any misdemeanor, and 508 apply to any felony
151

RICHARD L. LIPPKE, TAMING THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 214–15 (2016).
Id. at 214.
153 See Maureen A. Sweeney, Where Do We Go from Padilla v. Kentucky? Thoughts on Implementation
and Future Directions, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 353, 355–56 (2011).
154 To see the dramatic difference of sanctions applied to misdemeanors (8958) as compared to felonies
(18,963), see National Inventory, supra note 84 (follow arrow hyperlink; then select “Search Multiple
Jurisdictions”; then select “Any Misdemeanor” under “Offenses” and compare that result to “Any Felony”).
155 See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379 (1966) (explaining that actual petty offenses max out
punishment at six months).
156 See John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 1–3 (2013) (describing how the legal system defines the seriousness of a case solely based on the fact
incarceration); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1325 (2012) (“The legal system
devalues misdemeanor convictions . . . explicitly by labeling them ‘petty’ and by denying various procedural
rights.”).
157 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (2012); Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775, 779–
80 (2016).
158 Natapoff, supra note 156, at 1325 (“[T]he individual acquires a criminal record that can follow him or
her for a lifetime.”); see also Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the
Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 288–89, 292 (2011).
159 National Inventory, supra note 84 (follow arrow hyperlink; then select Florida).
152

RADICE GALLEYPROOFS2

2017]

6/14/2017 2:00 PM

THE REINTEGRATIVE STATE

1343

conviction.160 Thus, a person convicted of any misdemeanor can face potentially
268 civil sanctions, including the denial of dozens of employment licenses,
eviction from a mobile home, ineligibility to serve as someone’s guardian, and
expulsion from a Florida college.161 These civil consequences of a conviction
are not characterized by proportionality or finality.
The fact that hundreds of civil consequences attach to misdemeanors is
significant because, as many commentators have noted, misdemeanor courts are
“broken” and in “crisis.”162 And the majority of cases are actually misdemeanor
cases—a number that is growing.163 In each of the seventeen state courts systems
examined in 2010, over 64% of the criminal caseloads were misdemeanor
cases.164
Civil sanctions are also imposed without notice. Because they are not a part
of criminal sentencing, no notice of civil sanctions is offered prior to or at
sentencing, prompting one scholar to call civil consequences “invisible
punishments.”165 Defendants are not the only ones who do not know the civil
consequences of their convictions. Civil disability statutes “have been
promulgated with little coordination in disparate sections of state and federal
codes, which makes it difficult for anyone to identify all of the penalties and

160

Id.
For a list of laws authorizing these denials, see National Inventory, supra note 84 (follow arrow
hyperlink; then select Florida; then select “Any Misdemeanor” under “Offenses”).
162 See ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA N. BRINK & MAUREEN DIMINO, NAT’L ASS’N CRIMINAL DEF.
LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR
COURTS 11 (2009), https://www.nacdl.org/reports/misdemeanor/; Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor
System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2013) (“There is a misdemeanor crisis in the United States.”).
163 Roberts, supra note 158, at 280–82 (2011) (citing a recent study that “estimated that the volume of
misdemeanor cases nationwide has risen from five to more than ten million between 1972 and 2006”). There is
a growing literature on the impact of misdemeanor courts on defendants. See, e.g., Jason A. Cade, The PleaBargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1752–54 (2013); Erica J.
Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 464–66 (2007); K. Babe
Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 283–86 (2009); John D. King, Procedural Justice, Collateral
Consequences, and the Adjudication of Misdemeanors in the United States, in THE PROSECUTOR IN
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 20 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012); Natapoff, supra note 156, at
1315–17.
164 ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 24 (2012), http://www.courtstatistics.org/otherpages/~/media/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csp_dec.ashx (also showing that in North Carolina, Arizona,
and Washington, the percentage of misdemeanors cases were 92%, 89%, and 87%, respectively).
165 Travis, supra note 12, passim; see also Roberts, supra note 163, at 306–07 (explaining that in many
jurisdictions, pleas and sentencing for misdemeanors happen at an arraignment, offering a defendant little time
for legal counsel before a plea).
161
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disabilities that may be triggered by a criminal record for a certain offense.”166
This lack of notice is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla
v. Kentucky, which requires notice of at least certain civil consequences—those
affecting immigration status—prior to sentencing.167 In Padilla, the majority
found deportation to be such a severe, entangled, and integral consequence of
the defendant’s conviction that a defendant has not received the effective
counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment unless his attorney has advised him
of it.168 After Padilla, defense attorneys have to inform defendants of this civil
consequence even though deportation is not a part of the criminal sentence.169
The decision continues to raise questions about whether other “invisible
punishments” give rise to constitutionally required notice.170
Regardless of whether it is unconstitutional, though, a lack of notice is
unjust.171 The Reintegrative State would align civil sanctions with the
characteristics of just punishment by making them temporary and proportional
to the offense, and giving defendants notice of them prior to sentencing.
3. Economic Rationale
Perhaps the most politically compelling rationale for reintegration is that
reintegrative reforms could reduce the exploding costs of state criminal justice
budgets. From 1977 to 2010, as the prison population in the United States grew
from 300,000 to 1.5 million, the annual cost of corrections rose to $75 billion.172
These costs have been crippling for some states, especially after the recent
financial crisis that dramatically shrunk their budgets.173 As a result, prison

166

Project Description, supra note 16; Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators”, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 670, 678 (2008) (“[C]ollateral consequences are scattered throughout a variety of state and federal statutes
and regulations, and increasingly in local laws.”); see also Pinard, supra note 12, at 639 n.91.
167 559 U.S. 356, 373–74 (2010).
168 Id. at 374.
169 See id. at 364.
170 Travis, supra note 12, at 15–17.
171 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 25–28.
172 Cecilia Klingele, Criminal Law: Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1016–17, 1017 n.7 (2013); see also JOHN SCHMITT, KRIS WARNER & SARIKA GUPTA, CTR.
FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION 10 (2010), http://www.cepr.
net/documents/publications/incarceration-2010-06.pdf.
173 Klingele, supra note 172, at 1017.
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populations in some states exceed prison or budget capacities.174 The most vivid
example of overcrowding is California’s prison system, which was designed to
house 80,000 inmates, but by 2010 housed double that.175 In Plata v. Brown, the
Supreme Court found this excessive prison population a violation of the Eighth
Amendment, because inmates could not access adequate medical resources.176
But this problem is not unique to California.
Reintegrative approaches can reduce the cost of prison systems by
encouraging states to shift resources from incarceration to community
supervision, which is significantly cheaper.177 As reflected in the state statutes
described in Part II, many states already see this potential, and are funding an
expansion and diversification of their community supervision dockets.178
Through the federal Justice Reinvestment Initiative, states are incentivized to
reduce prison populations, and the seventeen participating states project savings
of up to $4.6 billion.179 Some states are funding evidence-based programs that
design supervision around risk assessments.180 For example, officers with people
placed as high risk would have lower caseloads and require more individual
monitoring.181 Other states are replacing technical violations with administrative
sanctions because technical violations, not new crimes, accounted for almost
20% of the population who reoffended in 1998.182
The shift to community alternatives to prison is a reintegrative approach
because it reduces the disruption of a person’s life. A person can continue to
work and keep family ties, two factors that encourage desistence from crime.
Reintegration policies that lower barriers to employment, housing, and
education have the potential to encourage desistance and lower recidivism,
which can in turn reduce states’ criminal justice budgets long term.

174 VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE POTENTIAL OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS TO IMPROVE SAFETY AND
REDUCE INCARCERATION 4 (2013), http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/potential-ofcommunity-corrections.pdf.
175 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011).
176 Id. at 507–08 (citing the district court’s finding that constitutionally deficient medical care had fatal
consequences, with one inmate dying every six to seven days).
177 Klingele, supra note 172, at 1019.
178 See infra Part II.B.
179 W. David Ball, Why State Prisons?, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 75, 76 (2014).
180 VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 174, at 26.
181 Id. at 18.
182 Id. at 13–14.
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4. Racial Equity Rationale
A central critique of the criminal justice system is that the system is fraught
with conscious and unconscious racial bias at every point of discretionary
contact with a defendant, from arrest to sentencing.183 The recent and overdue
attention to police shootings of young black men evidences this point.184 After
reviewing our criminal justice system’s reliance on the discretion of police,
prosecutors, and judges, William Stuntz concluded that “[d]iscretionary justice
too often amounts to discriminatory justice.”185 The continuing consequences of
a conviction and the stigma of a criminal record perpetuate that discrimination.
By removing them, the Reintegrative State helps remedy it.
As early as Yick Wo v. Hopkins186 in 1886, the Supreme Court has decided
cases challenging racial bias in prosecutorial discretion and sentencing.187 For
example, in Batson v. Kentucky,188 holding that the use of the peremptory
challenges by prosecutors purposefully to remove African Americans from
juries violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Justice Marshall explained in his concurrence:
A prosecutor’s own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him
easily to the conclusion that a prospective black juror is “sullen,” or
“distant,” a characterization that would not have come to his mind if a
white juror had acted identically. A judge’s own conscious or
unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an explanation as well
supported.189

And commenting on McCleskey v. Kemp,190 where the court rejected “stark
statistical evidence of race discrimination in the implementation of the death
penalty,”191 Justice Scalia, who agreed with the majority, explained:
183 Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
13, 16–18 (1998) (discussing the role of race and racism in prosecutorial decisions). The following discussion
of Supreme Court jurisprudence in my article draws on the arguments made by Angela Davis.
184 See, e.g., Wesley Lowery, Aren’t More White People than Black People Killed by Police? Yes, but No,
WASH. POST (July 26, 2016, 6:41 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/amphtml/news/post-nation/wp/2016/
07/11/arent-more-white-people-than-black-people-killed-by-police-yes-but-no/.
185 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5 (2011).
186 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (finding racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because
of prosecutorial discretion); Davis, supra note 183, at 44–45.
187 See Davis, supra note 183, at 42–48 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), which failed to find proof of racial bias in prosecutorial decisions).
188 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
189 Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
190 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
191 Davis, supra note 183, at 48.
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[I]t is my view that the unconscious operation of irrational sympathies
and antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence)
prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions of this
court, and ineradicable[.] I cannot honestly say that all I need is more
proof.192

Even when they do not find discriminatory intent, these Supreme Court cases
underscore that the “dominating feature of the American criminal justice system
is its deep racial disparities.”193 These disparities persist today. AfricanAmerican and Latino men are three times more likely to be searched during a
traffic stop than white men.194 African-Americans make up 37% of the prison
population but only 13.6% of the overall population.195 The Bureau of Justice
Statistics estimates that one in three African-American men and one in six Latino
men will be incarcerated over the course of their lifetimes, compared to one in
seventeen white men.196
The data on drug crimes presents a striking example of this race disparity.
African Americans are more likely to be prosecuted and sentenced for drug
crimes, they are not more likely than people of other races to commit drug
crimes.197 For example, as to marijuana use, African Americans and white
Americans report roughly equal use, African Americans are four times more
likely to be incarcerated for marijuana possession, a minor, non-violent crime.198
And as calculated in 2010, states spend roughly about $3.6 billion in enforcing
marijuana possession laws.199
Given this racial disparity in the criminal justice system, a criminal record
disproportionately stigmatizes people of color, a stigma that affects the families
192 Id. at 50 (quoting Justice Scalia’s Memorandum to the Conference, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987) (No. 84-6811)).
193 Roberts, supra note 114, at 331 (describing the disproportionate impact of race).
194 Traffic Stops, BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=702 (last visited Feb. 4,
2017).
195 E. ANN CARSON, DOJ, NO. NCJ 247282, PRISONERS IN 2013 (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/p13.pdf.
196 SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE: REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2013),
http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Race-and-Justice-Shadow-Report-ICCPR.pdf.
197 Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 254 (2002).
198 The War on Marijuana in Black and White, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/report/war-marijuana-blackand-white?redirect=criminal-law-reform/war-marijuana-black-and-white (last visited Mar. 4, 2016); see also
Roberts, supra note 114, at 331 (“Marijuana possession is a particularly important example because of the minor,
victimless nature of the crime (and of course, it is not a crime in a growing number of jurisdictions) . . . .”).
199 The War on Marijuana in Black and White, supra note 198.
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and communities of those with records.200 In finding employment, this stigma is
profound. One study using testers applying to hundreds of entry-level jobs201
showed racial bias at multiple points of interaction during the application
process, finding that African-American applicants were 50% less likely to get
callbacks than equally qualified white applicants.202 African-American and
Latino applicants with no criminal record “fared no better than a white applicant
just released from prison.”203
Recognizing the double penalty of race and record, the EEOC issued
Enforcement Guidance in 2012 about the “use of an individual’s criminal history
in making employment decisions . . . under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.”204
This guidance, which has been widely used by both job seekers and employers
alike, gives examples of unlawful discriminatory uses of criminal records.205
One example covers when employers cannot treat applicants with the same
criminal-history records differently based on race or other protected class
status.206 A second example covers when an employer’s reliance on criminal
records cannot lead to an exclusion of applications disproportionately by race
unless the employer can show that the exclusion is job related or consistent with
business necessity.207 Although none of the 2012 guidance was new, the
repackaging brought significant attention to the illegal use of convictions as the
sole reason for job rejections and the potential of illegally using race in a
disproportionate manner.208

200 Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 963, 965,
969 (2013) (noting that “poor individuals of color disproportionately bear the mark of a criminal record” and
that these burdens “disproportionately disrupt families and communities of color”).
201 Devah Pager, Bruce Western & Bart Bonikowski, Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field
Experiment, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 781 (2009). Some of the jobs included in the study were a line cook,
automobile salesman, warehouse worker, and clerk at an electronics store. Id. at 787–89.
202 Id. at 792. A prior study by Pager in 2001 in Milwaukee found similar results: a criminal record
significantly decreased an applicant’s likelihood for a callback, by a rate of 50% for white applicants, and 60%
for black applicants. DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION 67, 69 (2007). This study also showed that black applicants without a record were equally as
likely to get a job as white applicant with a criminal record. Id. at 90–91.
203 Pager, Western & Bonikowski, supra note 201, at 792–93.
204 OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, EEOC, NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE CONSIDERATION OF
ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964, at 1 (2012).
205 Id.; see also Pinard, supra note 200, at 983.
206 OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, supra note 204, at 6–8 (2012).
207 Id. at 8.
208 Pinard, supra note 200, at 983 (“The revised guidance . . . has been used in attempts to educate
employers about the illegality of imposing blanket bans on hiring individuals with arrest or conviction records.”).
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The use of criminal records has an economic and social cost for poor
communities of color. Incarceration “has broken families, . . . eroded economic
strength, soured attitudes toward society, and . . . increased rather than decreased
crime.”209 By removing or mitigating the impact of criminal records, the
Reintegrative State would contribute to reducing this disparate racial impact and
to giving greater credibility to the criminal justice system overall.
5. Moral Rationale
The Pope’s call for “the rehabilitation of those convicted of crimes”210
echoes concepts of redemption and forgiveness that are deeply rooted in
America’s Judeo-Christian traditions.211 Core values dating back to our colonial
past include notions of starting over, moving to a new frontier, and wiping a
slate clean.212 Even in 2004, President George W. Bush, in his State of the Union
address, described America as “the land of second chance,” explaining that
“when the gates of the prison open, the path ahead should lead to a better life.”213
The values of redemption and forgiveness are reflected in the long-standing
powers granted to the executive branch to pardon and grant clemency. Alexander
Hamilton explained the importance of pardons in the Federalist Papers:
[T]he criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary
severity that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of
unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and
cruel.214

209 TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES, HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED
NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 5 (2007).
210 See Berman, supra note 1.
211 See, e.g., Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need for Federal Expungement Legislation,
39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2008) (citing places in the Torah, Bible, and Qur’an where forgiveness is a central
tenant.).
212 Meg Leta Ambrose, Nicole Friess & Jill Van Matre, Seeking Digital Redemption: The Future of
Forgiveness in the Internet Age, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 99, 122–23 (2013) (explaining
that core American values from the pioneer histories, including wiping a slate clean and starting anew, “are in
stark contrast with existing data production, collection, retention, and retrieval practices” associated with
criminal records).
213 Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 81, 88 (Jan. 20,
2004).
214 See Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1332, 1360 (2008) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961)). Barkow explains that “[i]ndeed, executive clemency is even more relevant today than in the past because
of the decline of parole and probation and the increasingly harsh collateral consequences of incarceration.” Id.
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Admittedly, those pardon and clemency powers have rarely been exercised by
the President or by state governors (in contrast to their exercise in European
countries).215 Still, legal scholars have consistently looked to redemption as a
way to justify removing obstacles to reentry.216 Forgiveness is appealing because
it recognizes the wrongful conduct as distinct from the actor, and “paves the way
for the offender to return to the moral fold.”217 Although America’s criminal
justice system has consistently moved away from forgiveness and redemption,
reintegration could be the vehicle for incorporating these principles of mercy
without displacing the dominant penal principle of retribution.
II. THE STATE INTEREST IN REINTEGRATION
For the first time in the reentry literature, Part II identifies exactly how
reintegration surfaces as a state interest in three different types of legislation: (1)
statutes specifying the state’s criminal justice goals, (2) statutes governing the
state’s paroling and probation function, and (3) statutes establishing social
services reentry programs. Some states have passed only one type of
reintegration legislation; others have passed all three because these visions are
consistent with each other. The primary difference is that they pinpoint
reintegration at temporally different places in the criminal justice system.
A. An Integral Part of a State’s Penal Interests
Taking a legislative approach, several states have explicitly included
reintegration as a primary criminal justice penal objective, sometimes directly
alongside longstanding principles of punishment like retribution,218
215 See Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Restructuring Clemency: The Cost of Ignoring Clemency and a
Plan for Renewal, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015); see also MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, AM. CONSTITUTION
SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION: A PROGRESSIVE BLUEPRINT FOR THE SECOND
TERM 3 (2013), https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Love_-_Reinvigorating_the_Federal_Pardon_
Process_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/GH4K-RF9R]; Paul Rosenzweig, A Federalist Conception of the Pardon Power,
89 HERITAGE FOUND. LEGAL MEMORANDUM, Dec. 4, 2012, at 1, 2, http://www.heritage.org/research/
reports/2012/12/a-federalist-conception-of-the-pardon-power.
216 See THOMPSON, supra note 6; Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 124, at 328–29; Margaret Colgate
Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption, and the Uniform Collateral Consequences of
Conviction Act, 54 HOWARD L.J. 753, 759 (2011).
217 Roberts, supra note 114, at 339 (quoting Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 OHIO
ST. J CRIM. L. 329, 329 (2007)).
218 See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1659, 1686 (1992) (defining retribution as “a response to a wrong that is intended to vindicate the value of
the victim denied by the wrongdoer’s action through the construction of an event that not only repudiates the
action’s message of superiority over the victim but does so in a way that confirms them as equal by virtue of
their humanity”).

RADICE GALLEYPROOFS2

2017]

6/14/2017 2:00 PM

THE REINTEGRATIVE STATE

1351

incapacitation,219 and deterrence.220 Many states commit to reintegrate because
they intend for successful reintegration to reduce recidivism rates,221 which is
consistent with the state’s function to protect society from future offenses.
Reintegration can serve as an important bridge from punishment to restoration
of citizenship, allowing the state to reduce civil punishment associated with
convictions while protecting law-abiding state residents.
For example, Louisiana’s statute declaring the “goals of incarceration” was
amended recently to add the concept of reintegration. Originally, the goals listed
were “[t]o protect the citizens of the state of Louisiana, . . . [t]o punish conduct
which is defined as criminal, . . . [and] [t]o deter future [illegal] conduct.”222 In
the past decade, though, the legislature added a fourth goal: “[t]o rehabilitate
offenders so that they may be reintroduced into society as law-abiding
citizens.”223
The statute expressly “recognizes that when ex-offenders return to their
communities and families, they face numerous challenges to their successful
reentry into the community. Among these challenges, the most difficult to
overcome are the barriers to employment.”224 Given this recognition, the statute
concludes that it “shall be the public policy of [the] state to promote initiatives
that will provide ex-offenders with the support and services necessary to allow
them to find employment and make healthy connections with their families and
communities.”225 Thus, the goal of reintegration, not just punishment and
rehabilitation, is explicitly defined and included as a part of Louisiana’s criminal
justice goals.
In defining the general purposes of its criminal laws, the New York
legislature added reintegration in 2006 to the more obvious objectives of
offering people “fair warning” about what constitutes a crime, defining the
219 See David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner’s Dilemma: A Cost-Benefit Approach to Incarceration, 98 IOWA
L. REV. 905, 917 (2013) (“Incapacitation is the simplest of the mechanisms by which incarceration impacts
crime. The physical separation of inmates from the general population precludes those inmates from committing
crime on the public.”).
220 See id. at 916 (defining deterrence as “the reduction in crime that occurs due to the expectation of
punishment”).
221 See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:745.1(C) (2015) (declaring rehabilitation a state policy aimed at
“break[ing] the cycle of criminal recidivism”).
222 Act of May 30, 2014, H.B. No. 781, 2014 La. Advance Legis. Serv. 342 (codified at LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:745.1(C)).
223 LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:745.1(A)(4) (2015).
224 § 15:745.1(B).
225 § 15:745.1(D).
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“mental state which constitute[s] each offense,” and “differentiat[ing] . . .
between serious and minor offenses.”226 The general purposes of New York’s
criminal laws now include “the rehabilitation of those convicted[] [and] the
promotion of their successful and productive reentry and reintegration into
society.”227
Legislation in Colorado and New Jersey also endorses a direct link between
a fair criminal justice system and reintegration. In Colorado, the “general
assembly finds and declares that . . . [s]uccessful offender reentry into society is
critical to the criminal justice system.”228 In New Jersey, the legislature “finds
and declares that” preparing people for “release and reintegration into the
community . . . encourage[s] a more unified system of criminal justice.”229
Similarly, in Connecticut, the purposes of sentencing include “the provision
of meaningful and effective rehabilitation and reintegration of the offender.”230
In Kansas, the statutory role of prisons is “to rehabilitate, train, treat, educate
and prepare persons convicted of felony in this state for entry or reentry into the
social and economic system of the community.”231 In New Jersey, the purpose
and construction section of the statutes governing its Department of Corrections
explains that prisons “shall . . . provide for the custody, care, discipline, training
and treatment of adult offenders” to prepare them for “reintegration” into the
community.232
These statutes have been passed by states representing a range of political
perspectives, in different corners of the country, with large and small
populations. These states have not only recognized that they have an interest in
reintegration, but have also drawn a direct link between reintegration and longheld public policy goals of the state’s criminal justice system, including
protecting public safety and reducing costs of the criminal justice system.

226 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (McKinney 2009). These objectives connect to characteristics of fair
punishment including notice of the criminal act and its elements, and proportionality to the seriousness of the
crime.
227 Id.
228 2009 Colo. Sess. Laws 2216.
229 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:1B-3 (West 2008).
230 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-300 (2017).
231 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-5201 (2016).
232 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:1B-3.
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B. Establishing Reintegration as a Function of Parole and Probation
In addition to states that now include reintegration as a goal in their criminal
justice statutes, some states have passed statutes including reintegration as a part
of their parole or probation process, which is a part of the state’s executive
function. The connection between reintegration and state punishment is most
apparent in these statutes.
Historically, parole and probation officers have been responsible for a
person’s reintegration after conviction. But this role has shifted dramatically
over time.233 Prior to the seventies, parole and probation officers were similar to
social workers, often referred to as “change agents” and tasked with diagnosing
and rehabilitating probationers and parolees.234 A sentence of probation or a
decision to parole a person from prison was seen as a form of leniency.235 Since
the 1980s, the focus of both parole and probation has become more punitive,
mirroring the more retributive approach to sentencing generally.236 Parole and
probation officers manage a high volume of individuals and are tasked primarily
with monitoring behavior and compliance with supervision conditions to ensure
public safety, rather than to aid in rehabilitation.237
Adding reintegration as a goal of parole and probation signals a shift in the
goals for the paroling and probation authorities, establishing a dual function of
supervision and reintegration. New Jersey’s parole supervision legislation
requires that each parolee “be assigned a level of supervision appropriate to
maintain public safety, reduce the likelihood of recidivism and to ensure the
parolee’s positive reintegration into the community.”238 In Alabama, paroling
authorities are required to set up rules and conditions to provide both “intensive
supervision” and “placement of an inmate in the community” with the goal of
aiding “the reintegration of the inmate into society.”239 Maine’s parole
legislation is similarly unequivocal: it defines parole as “a system designed to
provide both supervision and assistance to the parolee in his re-establishment
into the community.”240 North Carolina’s statute recognizes that “post-release
supervision” has many objectives: “to monitor and control the prisoner in the
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240

ALARID & DEL CARMEN, supra note 37, at 91; PETERSILIA, supra note 6, at 77.
ALARID & DEL CARMEN, supra note 37, at 91.
Id.
See PETERSILIA, supra note 6, at 90.
See ALARID & DEL CARMEN, supra note 37, at 91.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:72–2.2 (2017).
ALA. CODE § 15-18-112 (2011).
03-208-001 ME. CODE R. § I.A (LexisNexis 2017) (emphasis added).
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community, to assist the prisoner in reintegrating into society, to collect
restitution and other court indebtedness from the prisoner, and to continue the
prisoner’s treatment or education.”241
Probation differs from parole in that probation offers a possibility for
supervision in the community as an alternative to a prison sentence. In 2013, for
example, almost five million people were on state or federal probation or
parole.242 Many state statutes also include reintegration in their state’s probation
function. California’s probation statute, for example, asserts that the “primary
considerations in the granting of probation” include “[t]he safety of the public,
which shall be a primary goal through the enforcement of court-ordered
conditions of probation,” and “the interests of justice, including punishment,
reintegration of the offender into the community, and enforcement of conditions
of probation.”243
Some state statutes offer more explicit instruction about the reintegrative
obligations of parole and probation authorities. Arkansas’s legislation requires
the parole board to “establish written policies and procedures . . . designed to
enhance public safety and to assist the parolees in reintegrating into society.”244
Parole supervision in Illinois includes “a continuum of treatment and program
services to assist the offender with successful reintegration into society.”245
Colorado’s division of parole “shall” provide “assistance in securing
employment, housing, and such other services as may effect the successful
reintegration of such offender into the community while recognizing the need
for public safety.”246
A growing number of states also endorse a shift from prison sentences to
community-based and evidence-based alternatives that function like probation
and parole and add a risk assessment test to determine the needed level of
supervision. Legislation supporting these non-prison alternatives directly links
reintegration to cost savings.247

241

N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1368 (2011).
LAUREN E. GLAZE & DANIELLE KAEBLE, DOJ, No. NCJ 248479, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2013, at 1 (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus13.pdf (“About 1 in 51 adults was
on probation or parole at yearend 2013, compared to 1 in 110 adults incarcerated in prison or local jail.”).
243 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.7 (West 2017) (emphasis added).
244 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-712 (2017).
245 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 470.70 (2017).
246 COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-22.5-403 (2016).
247 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3450 (West 2017).
242
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For example, the California legislature explains its shift to new evidencebased and community-based initiatives after conviction as a way to “improve
public safety outcomes among adult felon parolees and . . . facilitate their
successful reintegration back into society,” while also “manag[ing] and
allocat[ing] criminal justice populations more cost effectively.”248 A California
legislative finding supports this goal: “Criminal justice policies that rely on
building and operating more prisons to address community safety concerns are
not sustainable, and will not result in improved public safety.”249 Communitybased punishment, on the other hand, can include a range of less-expensive
alternatives, from “[s]hort-term flash incarceration in jail” for less than ten days,
to electronic monitoring and work-release programs.250 Supervision is cheaper
for the state and less disruptive to a person’s life, requiring fewer intensive
reentry resources.
In Mississippi, the legislature formed a council to “create effective strategies
to assist former inmates in their return to the general population, to reduce the
recidivism rates of inmates, to increase public safety, and to reduce budgetary
constraints presently created by prison-related costs.”251 States including
Kentucky, Illinois, New Hampshire, and Washington passed statutes that
“codified the use of a risk and needs assessment tool” to justify increased
community placement and supervision proportionate to risk of re-offense.252
While only about 10% of the entire criminal justice system budget goes to
probation or parole, two-thirds of the individuals in the criminal justice system
fall under parole or probation’s supervision.253 This is a significant factor in
whether the authorities tasked with reintegration can achieve that goal.

248

Id.
PENAL § 17.5. California’s legislative findings about recidivism support that the “period immediately
following incarceration is critical to successful reintegration of the offender into society and to positive
citizenship.” PENAL § 3074.
250 Id.
251 MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-7-101 (2017).
252 CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF PRISONS: WHAT
INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 12 (2012), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/
Price_of_Prisons_updated_version_072512.pdf.
253 PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, 1 (2009),
http://www.convictcriminology.org/pdf/pew/onein31.pdf.
249
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C. Developing Social Services Programs and a Judicial Function that
Enables Reintegration
The most common place for reintegration to surface in state legislation is in
statutes that authorize funding for state, local, or community-based reentry
initiatives. Many state statutes were prompted by Congress’s passage of the 2007
Second Chance Act (SCA),254 which appropriated over $475 million to support
reentry programs that “help people returning from prison and jail to safely and
successfully reintegrate into the community.”255 This Act was introduced by
President Bush’s 2004 State of the Union address256 and garnered significant
bipartisan support.257 Mentoring programs and reentry demonstration programs
serve the vast majority of people under the SCA grants, but other programs
include career assistance programs, mental health and drug treatment programs,
and reentry courts.258
Many states fund similar programs to assist in reintegrating people with
convictions. Some, like Montana, Oregon, and Tennessee, require reentry
planning as an essential part of release.259 Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and
Vermont offer examples of states with legislation requiring prisons to hire
reentry coordinators or contract with outside organizations to work with inmates
on reentry planning.260 In these states, reintegration begins before the inmate is
released.
Texas specifically requires the department of corrections to “develop and
adopt a comprehensive plan [for each inmate] to reduce recidivism and
254 For an analysis of SCA, see generally Jessica S. Henry, The Second Chance Act of 2007, 45 CRIM. L.
BULL., Summer 2009, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2344739. In April 2008, the Second
Chance Act was signed into law to authorize federal, state, and local grant programs to fund education,
employment, and alcohol and drug treatment services for people reintegrating into communities from prison.
Id.; Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008). The Act also requires states and
localities receiving funds to examine their statutory barriers to reentry in a variety of areas.
255 The Second Chance Act, BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, https://www.bja.gov/ProgramDetails.
aspx?Program_ID=90#horizontalTab4 (last visited Jan. 24, 2017); see also LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra
note 83, § 9:2, at 505.
256 See supra Part I.C.5.
257 Rob Portman & Danny K. Davis, Reauthorizing the Second Chance Act Is Essential to More Successful
Prisoner Reentry, ROLL CALL (Oct. 6, 2015, 8:29 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/reauthorizing_the_
second_chance_act_is_essential_to_more_successful-244058-1.html (discussing Republican senator from Ohio
and Democratic representative from Illinois urging passage of the bill reauthorizing SCA).
258 Id.
259 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-901 (2015); OR. ADMIN. R. 291-207-0030 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 411-412 (2016).
260 NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-903 (2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.034 (LexisNexis 2017); 37 PA. CODE
§ 94.2 (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3272 (2017).
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ensure . . . successful reentry and reintegration.”261 In Ohio, the prison facilities
fall under the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, emphasizing the
dual role of prisons to supervise and reintegrate. The Ohio reentry statute
requires “a written reentry plan for the inmate to help guide the inmate’s
rehabilitation program during imprisonment, to assist in the inmate’s reentry into
the community, and to assess the inmate’s needs upon release.”262 Louisiana also
developed a holistic approach through the Offender Reentry Support Pilot
Program, offering a range of services to inmates, including an education and job
skills plan, employment preparation prior to release, and help with housing,
substance abuse treatment, and family reunification.263
Some state funding for reintegration provides a more targeted approach,
offering post-incarceration mental health services,264 drug treatment
programs,265 housing assistance,266 and job search help.267 For example, in
Colorado, appropriations were allocated for “[c]ommunity-based mental health
consultants to provide assistance with case planning and to consult with and train
community parole officers concerning how to secure appropriate and available
mental health services for parolees in the community.”268 In New Mexico, the
legislature focused on developing a program that offered early release for
inmates willing to enter a drug court program.269 In addition to their role in
problem-solving drug courts, which often have a reentry component, judges
have played a significant role in reintegration more directly. As Part III describes
in greater detail, judges are often responsible under state statutes for mitigating
collateral consequences at sentencing, and granting expungement petitions and
certificates that relieve civil disabilities triggered by a conviction.270 In addition,

261

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.092 (West 2017).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.113 (LexisNexis 2017).
263 LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:745.2 (2016).
264 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5 (West 2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-33-101 (2016); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 353H-4 (2016); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 06.02.03.012 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-52,112 (2017);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-903 (2017); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 71-a (McKinney 2014); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 72.09.280 (2017); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3610 (2017).
265 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-81 (2017); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 71-a (McKinney 2014); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5120.035 (LexisNexis 2017); 61 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4105 (2016).
266 See ARK. ADMIN. CODE 004.00.2-892; CAL. PENAL CODE § 2985 (West 2017); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 72.09.280 (2017).
267 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5 (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:827.1 (2016); 103 MASS. CODE
REGS. 464.01 (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-904 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 72.09.280 (2017).
268 COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-33-101 (2016).
269 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-27 (2016).
270 See supra Part III.A–C.
262
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Reentry Courts were piloted in 2000 through a federal reentry grant initiative.271
Currently, many state and federal jurisdictions have established reentry courts
to directly involve judges in helping people reassimilate after their sentence is
complete.272
These examples by no means offer a comprehensive list of state grants for
reintegrating inmates using social services programs or the judicial role in
reintegration. But they show that federal and state governments already fund a
patchwork of different programs and strategies to assist individuals with
reintegrating back into society.
III. REINTEGRATIVE LEGISLATION IN THREE PHASES OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM
In addition to expressly identifying reintegration as a state interest, states
have incorporated reintegration approaches in three phases of the criminal
justice system: pre-conviction, at sentencing, and after a criminal sentence is
served. This Part presents concrete examples of how states reintegrate
individuals. In the public sphere, this often takes one of three forms: (1) preconviction relief mechanisms that avoid the creation of a criminal record
altogether; (2) sentencing relief mechanisms that mitigate or eliminate the
impact of state-created collateral consequences post-conviction; and (3) postconviction relief mechanisms that expunge criminal records entirely or certify a
person’s rehabilitation or reintegration. Extending beyond the public sphere, a
growing number of states have passed laws that limit a private employer’s ability
to discriminate against people with convictions.
In addition to describing state reintegration mechanisms, this Part also
critiques each approach. Ultimately, this Part shows that no single state offers a
comprehensive, intentional approach to reintegration. The approaches already in
place, however, inform and frame a more holistic Reintegrative State described
and advocated for in Part IV.

271
272

Melissa A. Knopp, Breaking the Cycle: Ohio Reentry Courts, 4 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 738, 748–50 (2015).
Id.
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A. Pre-Conviction Relief Mechanisms
Pre-conviction relief occurs when a person is arrested, charged, and at times
punished for an offense, but a public criminal record is not created.273 There is
no record because ultimately the charges are dismissed, sometimes after some
condition of punishment is met. No conviction exists to trigger civil collateral
consequences, like the removal of the right to vote or the denial of a state
employment license. The absence of a conviction also reduces the chance that
private entities like employers, schools, and landlords will discriminate against
the person. This state action meets the goals of reintegration because the state
has actively created a mechanism to avoid a criminal record, eliminating the
need for a person to reintegrate for relatively minor crimes with minor criminal
punishments.274
State statutes authorize pre-conviction relief in primarily three ways: (1) by
incorporating offenses that do not generate a conviction into their penal code;
(2) by offering pre-sentence relief mechanisms formally or informally, that
result in a dismissal of a charge; and (3) by removing dismissals from criminal
records.
1. Non-Conviction Offenses
New York’s penal code offers an example of the first approach. It creates an
offense category labeled “violations” that are distinct from misdemeanors and
felonies and are, by definition, not “criminal.”275 Only misdemeanors and
felonies prompt the creation of a public criminal record; violations do not.276
Violations cover minor offenses, other than traffic infractions, punishable
mostly by fines or at most by a jail sentence of fifteen days.277 These violations
keep minor offenses like disorderly conduct,278 trespass,279 possession of

273 When a person is arrested for a crime, the most common process begins with a charging decision by a
prosecutor, which is usually followed by plea negotiations with defense counsel. Those negotiations can result
in a defendant pleading guilty to a crime, the prosecutor dismissing the charges, or the case going to trial. If a
person pleads guilty or is found guilty at trial, she has a conviction on her criminal record.
274 See, e.g., Anthony Doniger, Alternative Justice, 52 BOS. BAR J., Jan./Feb. 2008, at 2, 2.
275 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(3), (5) (McKinney 2013).
276 § 10.00(5).
277 § 10.00(3) (“‘Violation’ means an offense, other than a ‘traffic infraction,’ for which a sentence to a
term of imprisonment in excess of fifteen days cannot be imposed.”).
278 § 240.20 (McKinney 2009) (“Disorderly conduct is a violation.”).
279 § 140.05 (McKinney 2009) (“Trespass is a violation.”).
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marijuana,280 and loitering,281 off a person’s criminal record, thereby preventing
collateral consequences. They also offer defendants the possibility to plead
higher-level charges down to a non-conviction offense.
Similarly, in Ohio some misdemeanors are labeled by statute as “minor
misdemeanor[s]”282 and do not create a criminal record.283 Minor misdemeanors
are defined by fairly minor punishment, including a fine of less than $150 and
community service.284 These minor offenses mirror New York’s violations and
include disorderly conduct,285 unlawful open containers,286 public
intoxication,287 and marijuana possession.288 As one example, the marijuana
possession statute makes clear that:
Arrest or conviction for a minor misdemeanor violation of this section
does not constitute a criminal record and need not be reported by the
person so arrested or convicted in response to any inquiries about the
person’s criminal record, including any inquiries contained in any
application for employment, license, or other right or privilege . . . .289

Although no criminal record is accessible to the public, the records of arrest and
the ultimate disposition of minor misdemeanors or violations are not destroyed.
Law enforcement retains this information. These records could be useful to
police and prosecutors if the person commits a new offense, and to judges for
future sentencing.
Penal statutes that define certain offenses as not worthy of inclusion on a
criminal record serve a reintegrative purpose. In most states, the offenses listed
as violations in New York or minor misdemeanors in Ohio would be
misdemeanor convictions that create a permanent public criminal record. For
low-level offenses like loitering or disorderly conduct, the criminal punishment
of a $150 fine, time served, or community service is minor, but the civil
collateral effects can last for years or even be permanent. This could make
280

§ 221.05 (McKinney 2009) (“Unlawful possession of marihuana is a violation . . . .”).
§ 240.35 (McKinney 2010) (“Loitering is a violation.”).
282 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.02(G)(2) (LexisNexis 2017).
283 § 2953.31 (LexisNexis 2017) (“For purposes of, and except as otherwise provided in, this division, a
conviction for a minor misdemeanor . . . is not a conviction.”).
284 § 2901.02(G)(2) (A minor misdemeanor is punishable by “a fine not exceeding one hundred fifty dollars,
community service . . . or a financial sanction other than a fine . . . .”).
285 § 2917.11(E)(2) (LexisNexis 2017) (“[D]isorderly conduct is a minor misdemeanor.”).
286 § 4301.62 (LexisNexis 2017).
287 § 2917.11(B) (LexisNexis 2017).
288 § 2925.11(C)(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2017) (“[P]ossession of marihuana is a minor misdemeanor.”).
289 § 2925.11(D).
281
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reintegration for someone with a minor offense who never served jail as difficult
as reintegration for someone who is convicted of a felony sentenced to a twoyear prison term because both have a criminal record. Employers may not know
or care to distinguish between convictions, especially if convictions of any kind
expose them to potential negligence-in-hiring lawsuits. Although the criminal
punishment is intended to be proportionate to the offense level, state-created
civil sanctions are often disproportionate.290 Avoiding the imposition of civil
collateral sanctions in the first place may be more efficient and effective for the
Reintegrative State. The next two examples of pre-plea relief serve the same
reintegrative objective.
2. Deferred Prosecution
Another form of pre-conviction relief, referred to by many names, including
deferred prosecution, pretrial diversion, or pretrial intervention,291 can be
informal or authorized by statute or court rule.292 Under deferred prosecution
statutes, the defendant does not plead to a charged offense. No criminal
judgment is formally entered by a judge. Rather the defense and prosecution
agree pre-plea that if a condition is met, the case will be dismissed.293 Conditions
imposed on the defendant can be defined by the statute or negotiated. They can
include paying restitution, completing a rehabilitation program, performing
community service, or simply not reoffending for a certain period of time.294
Prosecution is suspended and the case is ultimately dismissed, unless the
defendant does not satisfy the conditions (at which time the case can continue to
be prosecuted).
Pre-trial diversion programs vary by state. In Tennessee, for example, there
is both informal and formal deferred prosecution. A non-statutory disposition
sometimes referred to as a “pass and dismiss” exists in some jurisdictions,
allowing an informal agreement to exist between the prosecution and defense

290

See supra Part I.C.2.
4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.6(a), at 266 (4th ed. 2015).
292 LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 83, § 7:16, at 424–25; see also Debra T. Landis, Pretrial
Diversion: Statute or Court Rule Authorizing Suspension or Dismissal of Criminal Prosecution on Defendant’s
Consent to Noncriminal Alternative, 4 A.L.R. 4th 147, 151 (1981) (“Prosecutors have long employed diversion
on an informal, individual basis . . . .”).
293 LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 83, § 7:22, at 437.
294 Landis, supra note 292, at 150 (explaining that a diversion is created through “a statute or court rule
authorizing pretrial diversion or intervention programs providing for the suspension or dismissal of a criminal
prosecution subject to the defendant’s consent to treatment, rehabilitation, restitution, or other noncriminal or
nonpunitive alternatives” (footnotes omitted)).
291
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that places conditions on the defendant in exchange for dismissing the case.295
The pretrial diversion statute, however, is very detailed and specific about who
is “qualified” for deferred prosecution based on a person’s charge and previous
criminal history.296 Felony charges are not eligible,297 and the Tennessee Bureau
of Investigation certifies each eligible person for diversion. In addition to
requiring a ten dollar per month payment, not to exceed two years, the statute
requires that the defendant meet at least one of nine conditions, which include
not committing another offense, paying court costs, drug testing, or wearing a
monitoring device.298 Once the conditions are met, the judge is required to send
an order of dismissal for expungement.299
New York’s statute, on the other hand, authorizes the court to enter an
“adjournment in contemplation of dismissal” (ACD) that “adjourns” the case
“with a view to ultimate dismissal of the accusatory instrument in furtherance of
justice.”300 The prosecution must consent to an ACD, but no reason is
required.301 With the exception of certain charges,302 ACDs impose no specific
conditions on the defendant. If the case is not brought back to the docket within
six months or a year, depending on the charge,303 the case is dismissed and
shall not be deemed to be a conviction or an admission of guilt. No
person shall suffer any disability or forfeiture as a result of such an
order. Upon the dismissal of the accusatory instrument pursuant this
section, the arrest and prosecution shall be deemed a nullity and the
defendant shall be restored, in contemplation of law, to the status he
occupied before his arrest and prosecution.304

Pretrial diversion programs seek to efficiently dispose of cases, “conserving
scarce prosecutorial and judicial resources and . . . dealing more effectively with

295 See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-15-103, 40-35-313 (2016) (codifying formal judicial diversion and
discussing informal prosecutorial diversion); see also State v. Robinson, 328 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 2010) (“Judicial diversion is similar to pretrial diversion. However, judicial diversion follows a
determination of guilt, and the decision to grant judicial diversion is initiated by the trial court, not the
prosecutor.”).
296 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-15-105(a)(1)(B) (2016).
297 § 40-15-105(a)(1)(B)(iii).
298 §§ 40-15-105(a)(1)(A), 40-15-105(a)(2).
299 § 40-15-105(a)(3).
300 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55 (McKinney 2017). The timing of the dismissal depends on the case.
Most cases will be dismissed in six months.
301 PETER PREISER, PRACTICE COMMENTARY, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55 (McKinney 2015).
302 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55(3)–(7).
303 PREISER, supra note 301. The case is not docketed. The speedy trial clock is tolled.
304 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55(8).
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certain offenders.”305 Assuming the defendant committed the charged offense,
pretrial diversion offers a real benefit and serves a reintegrative goal by requiring
punishment without creating a record.
One potentially problematic result from these pretrial diversion statutes is
that an innocent defendant may agree to diversion to avoid any risk of being
found guilty at trial, essentially accepting punishment in exchange for the
guarantee of a dismissal. A person may feel compelled to take a deferred
prosecution if it is required for publically funded drug treatment or mental health
programs.306 Another critique of these statutes is that they are administered in a
“haphazard way,” and this discretionary characteristic can lead to treating
similarly situated defendants differently.307
3. Dismissed Charges, Acquittals, and Nolle Prosecutions
The third type of preconviction statutory relief is offered through state
statutes that expunge or seal dismissed charges, acquittals, and “nolle prossed”
charges308 from public criminal records. State statutes address these nonconvictions in three ways. The minority of states and the federal government do
not expunge, seal, or remove dismissed charges from a person’s criminal
history.309 For example, in Arizona, a record may note that the charges were
dismissed, but this is not automatic or mandatory.310
The vast majority of state statutes, however, provide for removal of
dismissed cases either automatically or by filing a separate petition to the court.
In Hawaii, arrests not leading to a conviction can be expunged as if the person
was never arrested.311 Some of these expansive statutes, like Tennessee’s, are
not automatic, but allow a person to petition the court to expunge a dismissal
provided that court costs are paid in full.312

305

LAFAVE, supra note 291, § 13.6(a), at 266.
LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 83, § 7:22, at 439.
307 LAFAVE, supra note 291, § 13.6(a), at 266.
308 See Scheibler v. Steinburg, 167 S.W. 866, 866 (Tenn. 1914) (defining nolle prosequi as “a formal
declaration of record by the prosecuting officer by which he declares that he will no further prosecute the case,
either as to some of the counts of the indictment or as to some of the defendants, or all together”).
309 LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 83, § 7:20, at 434. No law for expunging dismissed records
exists in Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, or Wisconsin. Id. at 434 n.2.
310 LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 83, § 7:20, at 434 n.2.
311 Id. app. A-148.
312 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32-101(a)(1)(A) (2016).
306
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A few statutes allow only a limited expungement of dismissals. A common
version is Florida’s statute, which removes dismissals only for first offenders.313
North Carolina authorizes an expungement for a dismissal if a person has no
prior felony convictions.314 Alaska allows a removal of a dismissal only in cases
of mistaken identity or false accusation.315
Leaving a dismissed conviction on a person’s criminal history runs counter
to reintegrative goals even if it serves other state interests, like that of deterrence.
Although the dismissal will not trigger state civil consequences, the dismissal
can impact a decision of a private actor like an employer or landlord. Seeing
even unfounded charges could lead to a conscious or unconscious inference that
the person has the potential for criminal liability or poor moral character. A
retailer seeing a dismissed assault or shoplifting charge may see it as a risk to
hire a person who was charged with a crime that could endanger their customers.
Pre-conviction relief statutes are helpful to the goal of reintegration. Their
greatest potential lies in their ability, at the front end of the criminal justice
system, to avoid the creation of a record and to prevent state-created civil
disabilities. But they are by no means sufficient. Some of these mechanisms fail
to be effective for reintegration because they are not automatic. Others apply
only to certain offenders, are limited in scope, and may be too discretionary or
coercive. Plus, they vary dramatically by state, which means even the same term
in one state can mean something very different in another.
B. Sentencing Relief Mechanisms
Sentencing offers another opportunity to avoid the creation of a criminal
record or mitigate the extent of a conviction’s civil disabilities or sanctions. With
sentencing mechanisms, a major difference is that the judge plays a prominent
role in deciding whether to mitigate the consequences of a conviction. State
statutes authorize relief at sentencing in two ways: (1) judicial diversion that
converts a plea into a dismissal, if conditions are met, so that no conviction is
ultimately entered; and (2) orders for relief from disabilities, which can remove
specified statutory obstacles arising from a person’s conviction. Sentencing
relief mechanisms can serve different reintegrative goals because the civil
disabilities can be proportioned to the criminal offense. In this way, state judges
313 LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 83, § 7:20, at 435 n.8 (noting exceptions to the first offender
requirement).
314 Id.
315 See ALASKA STAT. § 12.62.180(b) (2016).
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are the decisionmakers who ultimately authorize the civil consequences of a
conviction at sentencing.
1. Judicial Diversion
The two major differences between judicial diversion and deferred
prosecution are that judicial diversion requires a guilty plea and, in some states,
the approval of the judge. The ultimate benefit of successful completion of
judicial diversion can be the same as that of deferred prosecution—once a person
satisfies the terms of punishment, the judge can remove the plea and dismiss the
charge.316
State statutes limit diversion to certain offenses and first offenders. Most
focus solely on offering diversion for misdemeanor offenses, but twenty-four
states include specific felonies.317 One of the most expansive examples is
Vermont’s deferred sentencing statute that excludes only one crime, sexual
assault of a child, and immediately “strikes” the record of guilt upon completion
of the conditions and expunges the record provided restitution is paid.318 North
Carolina, like several states, focuses its deferred adjudication on first offenders
in misdemeanor or felony drug cases, and once the conditions are met, the
charges are dismissed, and no conviction is entered on the public record.319 But
North Carolina has a limited expungement statute, even for dismissals, so the
dismissal can remain on the record. Similarly, the Federal First Offender Act
offers diversion to individuals charged with certain drug offenses for the first
time.320
The requirement to plead guilty as a condition of judicial diversion is
significant if a person fails to meet the other conditions set by the statute. In this
case, a person’s disposition of diversion is automatically converted into a
conviction,321 and a public record of the conviction bears the same civil
consequences as someone who just pleads to the conviction. So the benefit of a
316 LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 83, § 7:22, at 440 (using “pretrial diversion” and “deferred
prosecution” interchangeably to refer to a no-plea form of pre-conviction relief, and the term “deferred
adjudication” to refer to relief requiring a guilty plea and satisfaction of conditions before dismissal). I use
deferred prosecution to refer to all pre-plea mechanisms, and “judicial diversion” to refer to relief requiring a
plea.
317 Id. § 7:22, at 441; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3607 (2012) (providing for deferred judgment under federal law
of drug offenses falling under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2012)).
318 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7041 (2017).
319 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-96(a) (2013).
320 18 U.S.C. § 3607.
321 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-96(a).
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diversion is that no conviction results from the charges, but the stakes for failure
are higher than in a deferred prosecution, where there is no plea and the case is
still open for adjudication. Prosecutors, on the other hand, prefer this automatic
and definite resolution of the case after a failure to comply, which does not
follow from a delayed prosecution.322 The plea offers a bigger stick for the
defendant to comply and finality of the case even with non-compliance. The
prosecutor does not have to renegotiate a plea or have a trial, making it a more
efficient use of prosecutorial or judicial resources.
Most states offer sealing or expungement of a diversion.323 While the
diversion remains on the record, the word “diversion” appears on a criminal
history until it is expunged. This can be significant if a person reading a criminal
history, like an employer, does not understand the meaning of a diversion. Even
states that allow expungement may require a person to petition to expunge a
diversion, rather than automatically remove the non-conviction.324 Others also
attach a hefty cost for filing.325
2. Sentencing Orders to Remove Civil Disabilities
One rare and underutilized sentencing relief mechanism allows a judge at the
time of sentencing to mitigate or remove civil state disabilities triggered by a
conviction before the conviction creates an obstacle for reintegration.326
New York327 and Illinois328 offer examples of this type of sentencing relief
through what both states call a Certificate of Relief from Disabilities (CRD).
New York’s statute covers individuals convicted of any number of
misdemeanors but at most one felony.329 There is no limit to the number of
CRDs a person can apply for, but they have to apply for a certificate for each

322

See id.
E.g., id.
324 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-145.2 (2014).
325 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32-101(g)(10) (2016) (requiring payment of $350 plus court costs and fees
when filing a petition to expunge a diversion); see also Diversions, Expungements, & Dispositions, TENN.
BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.tn.gov/tbi/article/diversions-expungements#sthash.E6OxiHSV.dpuf (last
visited Apr. 14, 2017).
326 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 2, 5.
327 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 702(1) (McKinney 2014) (“Such certificate may be issued (i) at the time sentence
is pronounced, in which case it may grant relief from forfeitures, as well as from disabilities, or (ii) at any time
thereafter . . . .”); see also Radice, supra note 110, at 727–30.
328 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5.5-15(a) (2016) (“The certificate may be issued (i) at the time sentence is
pronounced, in which case it may grant relief from disabilities, or (ii) at any time thereafter . . . .”).
329 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 700, 702(1).
323
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misdemeanor or felony, which can be an onerous requirement.330 And CRDs
only remove automatic civil sanctions, not discretionary ones—a strange
distinction made by the statute.331 New York, however, is the only state to attach
a legal enforcement mechanism to the certificate: issuance of the certificate
creates a rebuttable presumption of rehabilitation.332 Given this presumption,
discriminating against people with CRDs because of their convictions is more
difficult and requires the employer, state agency, or other authority to articulate
the specific rationale for the denial based on eight statutorily defined factors.333
On the other hand, a CRD also protects employers from negligence-in-hiring
lawsuits.334
The Illinois statute, largely based on New York’s law, applies to a broader
range of convictions, excluding only violent and sexual offenses, and it offers a
similarly defined presumption of rehabilitation.335 It is more limited in its reach
though, applying only to twenty-seven state licenses.336 The certificate also
specifies which disability it relieves and does not offer general relief of all
disabilities.337
Two model statutes, the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Convictions
Act (UCCCA) and the Model Penal Code (MPC), offer additional examples of
sentencing relief mechanisms. The MPC endorses a “process for obtaining
review of, and relief from, any discretionary disqualification.”338 The UCCCA
creates “order[s] of limited relief,” which would be granted as early as
sentencing to mitigate far-reaching civil consequences—“employment,

330 Joy Radice, Administering Justice: Removing Statutory Barriers to Reentry, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 715,
730 (2012).
331 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 701(3); see also N.Y. LEGISLATIVE SERV., INC., NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE
ANNUAL 1983, at 254 (1983) (“Section 701 of the Corrections Law prohibits automatic forfeitures of a license,
upon the granting of a certificate of relief from disabilities . . . .”); Radice, supra 110, at 753.
332 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753(2).
333 § 753(1); Radice, supra note 110, at 752–53.
334 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(15) (McKinney 2016) (providing for presumption of excluding prior
criminal history from evidence of negligence in hiring when the employer has complied with the statutory nondiscrimination policy, including consideration of certificate of rehabilitation).
335 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-5.5-5 (2016); LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 83, § 7:23, at
445 n.4.
336 Id.; see also MARGARET LOVE & APRIL FRAZIER, ABA COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS,
CERTIFICATES OF REHABILITATION AND OTHER FORMS OF RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CONVICTION: A SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 4 (2006) (explaining the process for certification).
337 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-5.5-15.
338 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 5–6.
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education, housing, public benefit, or occupational licensing.”339 Despite their
immediate reintegrative potential, few states have such relief mechanisms.340
As one example of how these certificates can be useful, dozens of jobs
require state-issued employment licenses that can be lost automatically or at the
discretion of the licensing board if a person is convicted of a crime.341 Homehealth aides,342 barbers,343 truck drivers,344 security guards,345 funeral
directors,346 school bus drivers,347 and taxi drivers348 all require a license. Given
the authority to issue a limited or full administrative relief certificate or order,
the sentencing judge could consider the impact of losing the license relative to
the nature and severity of the crime and issue the certificate to remove just one
specific disability or all civil disabilities related to a conviction. For a person
convicted of a crime that is unrelated to their license, the certificate of relief
could effectively keep them from being immediately unemployed.
The most problematic part of these limited relief mechanisms is that they are
not automatically triggered by low-level offenses. Defense attorneys must know
what civil collateral consequences will disadvantage their clients and must
establish the need for the certificate. Additionally, sentencing judges must be
willing to use their discretion to offer relief. The track record in both New York
and Illinois for issuing certificates has not been promising for reintegration.349
The potential of these certificates is that they can be individualized toward a
particular defendant’s circumstances to ensure the civil consequences are
calibrated with the criminal punishment, meeting the objectives of reintegration.
Lack of employment strongly correlates with recidivism rates, making it part of
the state’s interest to consider sentencing options that do not create civil

339

UNIFORM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT § 10 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS
UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateral_consequences/uccca_final_
10.pdf.
340 See id. § 10.
341 Radice, supra note 110, at 752–53 (describing the rarity of certificates of relief at sentencing in New
York).
342 See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 415.31 (2017).
343 See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 432 (McKinney 2012).
344 See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 503 (McKinney 2017).
345 See, e.g., id. tit. 9, § 6029.6.
346 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3450 (McKinney 2012).
347 See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 509-CC (McKinney 2016).
348 See 52 PA. CODE § 1021.4 (2017).
349 LOVE & FRAZIER, supra note 336, at 4; Radice, supra note 110, at 756.
ON
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consequences that are more long term, punitive, or disproportionate to the crime
than the criminal penalty.
C. Post-Conviction Relief Mechanisms
The area where states have invested the most time in creating relief
mechanisms to mute the impact of civil sanctions is after the criminal
punishment is complete. States authorize different degrees of legal reintegration
after a sentence is complete in three main ways: (1) statutes that expunge, setaside, vacate, or pardon convictions; (2) statutes that authorize administrative
restoration of rights; and (3) statutes that prohibit discrimination based a
criminal record. Expungement, set-asides, vacatur, or pardons actually have the
power of removing certain convictions from public criminal records, most
commonly after a statutorily defined period of “good conduct” during which a
person does not commit a new offense.350 Administrative relief mechanisms are
issued to remove statutory barriers without removing the conviction itself from
the public records after a conviction-free period.351 Antidiscrimination statutes
do nothing at all to alter a criminal record or remove civil disabilities tied to
them. Instead, they set legal limitations on how public and private actors can
discriminate against people with convictions.352
1. Expungement, Set-Asides, and Pardons
Expungement, set-asides, vacaturs, and pardons allow one or more
convictions to be removed from a person’s public criminal history. Very rarely
though are these criminal records erased completely, similar to the treatment of
the records of Ohio’s minor misdemeanors and New York’s violations. Most
often, states retain non-public records related to these convictions, including
police reports, prosecution files, and fingerprints, and allow their release for
certain employment like law enforcement, government jobs, and military
service. They serve a continued law enforcement purpose for future state and
federal prosecution and sentencing enhancements even if they are not viewable
by the public.353

350
351
352
353

See infra Part III.C.1.
See infra Part III.C.2.
See infra Part III.C.3.
LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 83, § 7:17, at 429.
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Expungement statutes originated in the 1940s when the concept was first
applied to juvenile offenses.354 Most states currently allow expungement or
sealing of juvenile delinquency records.355 And over the past two decades, state
legislatures on both sides of the political aisle have passed expungement statutes
to eliminate the permanency of an adult criminal record. But no state offers the
possibility of automatic and complete expungement of criminal records even
after a certain time period has passed without a new conviction. These statutes
are an example of how the state interest to reintegrate and to protect the public
can be in tension and requires the state to choose between both objectives.
Expungement statutes vary dramatically by state. They differ in terms of who
is eligible, when they can apply, whether the expungement is automatic or
discretionary, and whether evidence of “rehabilitation” must be submitted. The
most expansive expungement statute is arguably Puerto Rico’s because it allows
even violent felonies to be expunged, and depending on the severity of the
offense, expungement can occur as quickly as one year after the offense
provided no new convictions occur, or up to twenty years afterward for the most
violent crimes.356
In Kansas, more than one conviction, which includes a non-specified number
of misdemeanors and many felonies, can be expunged provided that anywhere
from two to ten years have lapsed since the end of the sentence, and the person
has paid related court costs.357 Also in 2017, Montana passed an expungement
statute allowing mutliple misdemeanor convictions to be expunged as a one time
opportunity.358 This expungement destroys all records even for law enforcement
and licensing agencies.359 Over thirty states since 2012 have enacted “some form
of record-closing law,” or expanded existing laws.360 In Massachusetts,
misdemeanors can be sealed after five years of good conduct, and felonies after

354

Id. at 426.
Id. at 430–31.
356 Id.
357 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6614(a)–(d) (2016) (providing a three to five year waiting period for
misdemeanors and eligible A, B, and C felonies and a ten-year waiting period for DUI felonies). Crimes excluded
from eligibility include only the most serious listed felonies in subsection (e), including rape, murder,
manslaughter, and criminal sodomy. § 21-6614(e).
358 Montana Just Authorized Expungement of Adult Convictions ,COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE
CENTER (May 1, 2017), http://ccresourcecenter.org/2017/05/01/montana-latest-to-authorize-expungement-ofadult-convictions/.
359 Id.
360 Id.
355
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ten years.361 New York in 2017 passed a sealing statute allowing an individual
to ask a court to seal up to two convictions, only one of which can be a felony,
after a 10-year waiting period.362 Although the vast majority of states exclude
serious felonies, at least six states allow sealing of serious felonies.363
The most common form of expungement, though, is more limited and applies
either to individuals who are deemed eligible “first offenders” or people who
commit a specific type of crime, like low-level drug offenses or non-violent
offenses.364 The first-offender expungement statutes are premised on a similar
logic to that of diversion cases. These statutes offer a second chance to
individuals who have only one, minor, non-violent conviction on their record.
After a period of time passes without a new offense, the person can apply for an
expungement.
Many states have similar, limited first-offender expungement provisions.
Tennessee’s statute offers expungement for most misdemeanors and also
specifically enumerated class E felonies, provided a person has only one
conviction on her record,365 after five crime-free years have passed from the end
of the criminal sentence.366 The very limited federal expungement statute, the
Federal First Offender Act, expunges only misdemeanor drug offenses for
individuals who were under twenty-one years old at the time of the conviction.367
The concept of expungement has received increasing attention in the media.
Because there are so many variations from state to state, individuals with
convictions and the people viewing their records may not understand how
361 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (2017). For Nevada’s similar statutory scheme, see NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 179.245, 179.285, 179.301 (2016).
362 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.59(2)(a) (Consol. 2017) (establishing the first robust sealing provision in
New York); see also New York Surprises with Broad New Sealing Law, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
RESOURCE CENTER (Apr. 19, 2017), http://ccresourcecenter.org/2017/04/19/new-york-surprises-with-broadnew-sealing-law/. The new law excludes violent felonies, sex offenses, and Class A felonies. N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 160.59(1)(a).
363 The states that expunge serious felonies are Indiana, Idaho, Minnesota, Utah, Vermont, and Washington.
See LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 83, app. A-7.
364 Id. § 7:16, at 425.
365 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32-101 (2016) (explaining that an eligible person is “[a] person who was
convicted of more than one (1) of the offenses listed in this subdivision (g)(1), if the conduct upon which each
conviction is based occurred contemporaneously, occurred at the same location, represented a single continuous
criminal episode with a single criminal intent, and all such convictions are eligible for expunction . . . ”). This
one conviction rule includes federal and out-of-state convictions as well. Id.
366 Id.
367 18 U.S.C. § 3607(c) (2012); Roberts, supra note 114, at 324–25 (“There is no general federal sealing or
expungement statute and only one narrow provision allowing individuals who were under 21 at the time of the
offense to expunge a federal record for a misdemeanor drug charge.”).
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expungement and other relief mechanisms work and to whom they apply. If an
employer, for example, sees an old conviction on a record, employers may be
concerned with why it is not expunged and assume that the person was not
worthy of expungement, causing an unnecessary negative inference about the
applicant. In reality, though, most expungement statutes are limited and are not
automatic, making those old convictions either ineligible for the expungement,
or creating a burden on the person to petition for it.368 In some states, the real
hurdle is the expungement application itself, which is difficult to complete
without the help of a lawyer. In other states, the fee for filing an expungement
petition is prohibitively expensive.369
Set-asides and pardons are rare, but in different ways. They are included in
this section because they provide two additional models of how states have opted
to remove convictions from a public criminal record. A set-aside, also called a
vacatur or annulment, is rare because few states have them. These statutes permit
a sentencing judge to remove a guilty plea and set it aside, vacate, or annul it.
This resembles the Model Penal Code’s vacatur recommendation for mitigating
the impact of convictions.370 In some states, like California, a vacatur does not
remove a public record, but instead converts the conviction to a dismissal.371 In
Washington, every offender is eligible to apply to vacate the record of
conviction, and in New Hampshire, set-asides place a person in the same
position they were in pre-arrest, removing all civil consequences of a
conviction.372
As described earlier in Part I, in theory, executive pardons are available in
every state, but very rarely are pardons granted. Only fourteen states process

368

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32-101(g)(1)(E)(2)–(4).
For instance, compare Tennessee and Ohio. In some jurisdictions in Tennessee, an expunged conviction
cost $450 in 2017 (part of that figure is a statutory fee and the other is an administrative fee that is county
specific). See Expungement Information, KNOX COUNTY CRIM. COURT, https://www.knoxcounty.org/
criminalcourt/services/expungement.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2017). In Ohio, filing fees range from $50–$125
depending on the county and may be waived if a person provides proof of indigency in some counties. See OHIO
EX-OFFENDER REENTRY COALITION, INSTRUCTIONS FOR SEALING A CRIMINAL RECORD, http://www.
reentrycoalition.ohio.gov/docs/expunge.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2017). (These figures to not include the cost of
hiring an attorney); Clerk of Courts Fees, FULTON COUNTY OHIO, http://www.fultoncountyoh.com/
index.aspx?NID=553 (last visited May 2, 2017) (assessing $125 for expunging a criminal record, including the
state fee).
370 See Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with A Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten Section of the
Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1711–13 (2003).
371 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 2017); LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 83, § 7:21, at 436.
372 LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 83, § 7:21, at 436.
369
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pardons regularly.373 As a result, very few eligible people apply.374 A pardon,
though, is one of the most comprehensive forms of relief in that there are no
restrictions on who can apply, and it restores a person’s legal status as though
the person “never committed the offence.”375
In several states, including Kansas, Nevada, New Hampshire, and
Massachusetts, people with expunged, set-aside, or pardoned records are
returned to their pre-arrest status, as if they were not arrested or convicted.376
This language has the potential to restore all civil disabilities attached to the
conviction. Some states go further and permit a person to deny a conviction and
the preceding arrest.377 But as discussed below, this new legal status can be
problematic for both the person with a record and a person or entity pulling the
record.
Each of these three mechanisms purports to remove a conviction from a
public criminal record. They fail to succeed, though, if the older, non-expunged
record is accessible to the public through other means. Most states, even those
with broad expungement authority, facilitate the sale of records of arrests and
convictions by providing them as publicly accessible information.378 When a
dismissal or conviction is expunged, rarely do states have laws requiring private
companies to remove expunged records.379 These lingering records become
especially problematic in states where people can deny a conviction, but an
employer ultimately sees the conviction on a background check. Dishonesty on
an application is generally a legal justification for denying a person a state
benefit or a job.380 An applicant relying on the expungement may not realize that
the non-disclosure caused the rejection and may not have a chance to explain the
expungement issue.
Critics of expungement, even those who ultimately support reintegration and
believe that old or minor convictions should not permanently change a person’s
legal status, oppose treating a conviction as a legal fiction.381 Some doubt that

373

Id. § 7:12, at 415.
Id. § 7:12, at 417.
375 Id. § 7:6, at 398.
376 See id. § 7:17, at 429; see also Kansas v. Divine, 246 P.3d 692, 695 (Kan. 2011).
377 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-153 (2013).
378 See Roberts, supra note 114, at 328–29.
379 See id. at 345–46.
380 Id. at 342.
381 Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and
Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 529 (2010) (explaining that opponents of expungement argue that it “‘seeks to
374
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with today’s technology “criminal record information can effectively be
suppressed.”382 But others argue that background checks are so inaccurate that
job applicants take a great risk by not revealing criminal history information that
can still be found on the Internet.383
2. Administrative Restoration of Rights
Growing in popularity are administrative certificates that partially or fully
restore civil statutory disabilities (similar to Certificates of Relief from
Disabilities384). The major difference is their timing—they are available only
after a criminal sentence is served, court costs and fees are paid, and a crimefree waiting period, usually proportioned to the seriousness of the offense, has
been exhausted.385 They are issued by sentencing courts, parole boards, or
committees formed specifically to review certificate applications.386 Some of
them even “certify” that a person is rehabilitated and is unlikely to reoffend.387
For some states, the passage of time without a new conviction serves as the
primary evidence of rehabilitation.388 In other states, the application requires
additional “proof” of rehabilitation that can range from evidence of a consistent
work history to recommendation letters and character references.389
As one example, New York issues Certificates of Good Conduct (CGC) at
the discretion of sentencing judges or parole boards for applicants who present
rehabilitation evidence and have cleared a waiting period of one to five years
depending on the severity of the crime.390 Like a CRD issued at sentencing, this
certificate has legal teeth through an enforceable, rebuttable presumption of
rehabilitation.391 To further incentivize employers to hire people with
convictions, New York passed a negligence-in-hiring statute that offers
employers a defense if a hired applicant has one of the New York CGCs.392

rewrite history, establishing that something did not happen although it really did,’ and, by essentially erasing the
conviction from public view, ‘devalue[s] legitimate public safety concerns’” (footnotes omitted)).
382 Jacobs, supra note 10, at 131.
383 Id.
384 See supra notes 327–36 and accompanying text.
385 Radice, supra note 110, at 727; see also LOVE & FRAZIER, supra note 336, at 3–6.
386 LOVE & FRAZIER, supra note 336, at 3–6.
387 See, e.g., id. at 5–6.
388 See id. at 7.
389 See generally LOVE & FRAZIER, supra note 336.
390 Id. at 3.
391 Id.
392 Radice, supra note 110, at 745.
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A handful of states offer similar discretionary, post-conviction,
administrative relief mechanisms with their own unique characteristics.393 For
example, California’s statute authorizes a Certificate of Rehabilitation as the
first step to a pardon.394 It can remove significant civil disabilities to state
licensing for people with felony convictions, and can serve as evidence of
rehabilitation for private employers.395 Like those issued in New York, the
certificates issued in Illinois, North Carolina, and Ohio provide immunity to
employers worried about negligence-in-hiring lawsuits.396 New Jersey’s
certificate removes licensing barriers even if a person has out-of-state
offenses.397
The Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, similar to its
sentencing relief order,398 also presents a model statute to create a Certificate of
Restoration of Rights that provides civil relief after a period of good conduct.399
This certificate is issued by a non-judicial administrative authority.400 The
Model Penal Code endorses a similar certificate by the sentencing court.401
As an alternative approach to these more encompassing certificates, some
states have recently authorized a more limited Certificate of Employability
targeted specifically at encouraging private employers to hire people with
convictions. The certificate seeks to act as the state’s stamp of approval that
these individuals have a low-risk of reoffending. One of the most expansive
versions passed in 2015 is Michigan’s certificate. The certificate serves as
evidence that “an employer did not act negligently in hiring.”402 These
393 California, Connecticut, Illinois, Nevada, and Ohio all offer these mechanisms. See LOVE & FRAZIER,
supra note 336.
394 CAL. PENAL CODE § 4852.17 (West 2017); LOVE & FRAZIER, supra note 336, at 5.
395 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4852.16, 4853 (deeming issuance of a certificate to be an application for a full
pardon that restores all rights and privileges of citizenship); cf. PENAL § 4852.17 (explaining that the certificate
does not seal or remove the conviction from a criminal record). For an example of San Diego’s application form,
see SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL. CTY. OF SAN DIEGO, CERTIFICATE OF REHABILITATION & PARDON INFORMATION
PACKET (2014), http://www.sdcourt.ca.gov/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/SDCOURT/GENERALINFORMATION/
FORMS/CRIMINALFORMS/PKT016.PDF.
396 For more on negligence statutes, see infra notes 402–06 and accompanying text.
397 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:168A-1, 2A:168A-7-16 (West 2011).
398 See UNIFORM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT § 10 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateral_consequences/
uccca_final_10.pdf.
399 Id. § 11.
400 See id. § 11(b).
401 Love, supra note 370, at 1711–13.
402 SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, MICH. LEGISLATURE, PRISONER EMPLOYABILITY: BILL ANALYSIS (2014),
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2013-2014/billanalysis/Senate/pdf/2013-SFA-5216-F.pdf; see also
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 338.42, 600.2956a, 791.234d (2017).
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certificates, valid for four years, are issued to individuals thirty days prior to
parole, given evidence that they have had no major conduct violation in prison
and completed a job-training course.403 Connecticut’s certificate of
rehabilitation can be awarded by the Board of Pardon or Parole at any time
before or after the sentence is served.404 It is considered a provisional pardon—
usually this certificate is issued earlier than a pardon, is tailored to remove
specific sanctions or disqualifications, and provides a rebuttable presumption of
rehabilitation.405
The value of Certificates of Employability in Michigan and Connecticut is
two-fold. They are immediately issued once a prison sentence is complete, when
the potential for recidivism is highest and employment is a solid indicator that a
person will not reoffend. Additionally, they are legally enforceable given the
presumption of rehabilitation created. Other, more limited, Certificates of
Employability still offer benefits against negligence-in-hiring lawsuits and
remove statutory licensing barriers.406
The biggest critique of administrative certificates overall is that most
certificates are not enforceable, making them at best symbolic of rehabilitation
because employers still learn about the conviction. However, the new EEOC
guidance described in Part I gives employers examples of how to determine if a
conviction is related to a job.407 This guidance makes clear that it is illegal for a
conviction to be the sole reason for denying a person a job, and presents
examples of when a conviction can be a legitimate factor for rejecting an
applicant.
In addition to enforceability issues, administrability is problematic as well.
In some states, either certificates are not issued regularly even with hundreds of
eligible applicants, or there is a delay between filing an application and award a
certificate.408 One researcher described New Jersey’s certificates as not
operationally useful because they are rarely sought or granted.409 Even in New
York, where certificates were first created in the 1940s, potential applicants

403

§ 791.234d(2), (3).
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-130a (2017).
405 §§ 54-130a, 54-130e.
406 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-107 (2016) (offering a certificate that protects employers against
negligence in hiring suits); see also OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5120-14-01, 5120-15-01 (2013) (creating a “Certificate
of Achievement and Employability” and a “Certificate of Qualification for Employment”).
407 OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, supra note 204, at 1.
408 See LOVE & FRAZIER, supra note 336.
409 Id. at 2, 5–6.
404
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today do not know that they exist, find the application process too difficult to
understand, or feel they are just a piece of paper and will not really help them.410
Also, most certificate programs are discretionary, and applicants can in theory
be rejected without sufficient proof of rehabilitation, even though statutes do not
adequately define what that evidence should be.411 These flaws dilute the overall
potential of these certificates to reintegrate people even with low-level
convictions.
3. Limiting Discrimination on the Basis of Conviction
Three types of statutes aim to reintegrate people with convictions by either
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of convictions or incentivizing the hiring
of people with convictions: anti-discrimination statutes, “ban-the-box”
legislation, and immunity from negligence-in-hiring statutes. They do not
remove convictions from a public criminal record, and they do not certify that a
person has been rehabilitated. Rather, they present conditions under which a
government authority, like a licensing body, or a private actor, like an employer,
cannot or should not use a conviction as a reason to deny a person a state license,
public sector job, or private employment.
Although more than thirty states offer some form of protection against
discrimination based on conviction,412 the majority of state statutes are limited
to public jobs and licensing agencies.413 The value of these anti-discrimination
statutes is that they signal that state employers are not using conviction status
for automatic job rejections, and they can mitigate civil statutes that allow
discretionary denials of licenses.
The problem with most state statutes is that they begin with general
statements prohibiting the use of convictions to reject applicants in public
employment or licensing, but then include broad exceptions to the prohibition.
Kentucky,414 Florida,415 Minnesota,416 and Connecticut417 do not permit

410

Radice, supra note 110, at 765–67.
Id. at 762–63.
412 LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 83, § 6:16, at 363.
413 For a list of nine examples of public bans on discrimination by conviction, see LEGAL ACTION CTR.,
OVERVIEW OF STATE LAWS THAT BAN DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYERS, http://lac.org/toolkits/standards/
Fourteen_State_Laws.pdf.
414 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 335B.020 (West 2017).
415 FLA. STAT. § 112.011 (2017).
416 MINN. STAT. § 364.03 (2016).
417 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-80(c) (2017).
411
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discrimination “solely” because of a conviction.418 But all four states carve out
exceptions, often undefined, for convictions that “directly relate,” “substantially
relate,” or have a “reasonable relationship” to the job or license sought.419
Kentucky’s statute is an example of one of the most deceivingly restrictive
bans. It begins with “[n]o person shall be disqualified . . . solely because of a
prior conviction of a crime, unless,” and then lists two very encompassing
exceptions.420 One exception lists crimes that are not protected at all, including
all “felonies, high misdemeanors, and misdemeanors for which a jail sentence
may be imposed,” as well as crimes of moral turpitude,421 covering the bulk of
the criminal code. The other exception allows disqualification for a crime that
“directly relates” to the job or license.422 The otherwise vague term of “directly
relates” is defined in Kentucky by three equally vague factors assessing: the
seriousness of the crime, the relationship between the crime and the purpose of
regulating the position, and the relationship of the crime to carrying out the
duties of the job or license.423
Colorado’s statute has a different model in that it requires state agencies to
determine if an applicant is a finalist or should receive a conditional offer prior
to conducting a background check.424 Once a conviction surfaces though, the
Colorado statute adds two additional factors to Kentucky’s three: (1) the time
since the conviction, and (2) any evidence of rehabilitation or good conduct
offered by the applicant.425 Through this complicated mechanism of accepting
418 New Mexico states this a little differently; it does not permit a conviction to be an “an automatic bar”
for a job or license. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-3 (2017).
419 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-80(c) (“A person may be denied . . . after considering . . . the nature
of the crime and its relationship to the job for which the person has applied . . . .”); FLA. STAT. § 112.011 (“[A]
person may be denied employment . . . by reason of the prior conviction for a crime if the crime was . . . directly
related to the position of employment sought.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 335B.020(1) (“No person shall be
disqualified . . . unless the crime for which convicted . . . directly relates to the position of employment sought
or the occupation for which the license is sought.”); MINN. STAT. § 364.03 (“[N]o person shall be disqualified . . .
unless the crime or crimes for which convicted directly relate to the position of employment sought or the
occupation for which the license is sought.”).
420 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 335B.020(1).
421 § 335B.010(4).
422 § 335B.020(1).
423 § 335B.020(2) (“In determining if a conviction directly relates to the position of public employment
sought or the occupation for which the license is sought, the hiring or licensing authority shall consider: (a) The
nature and seriousness of the crime for which the individual was convicted; (b) The relationship of the crime to
the purposes of regulating the position of public employment sought or the occupation for which the license is
sought; (c) The relationship of the crime to the ability, capacity, and fitness required to perform the duties and
discharge the responsibilities of the position of employment or occupation.”).
424 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-5-101(3)(b) (2016).
425 § 24-5-101(4).
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an applicant conditionally and then conducting a five-factor balancing test,
Colorado intends “to expand employment opportunities for persons who,
notwithstanding that fact of conviction of an offense, have been rehabilitated
and are ready to accept the responsibilities of a law-abiding and productive
member of society.”426 Although this is clearly a reintegrative goal, the approach
may be so complicated that it is hard to challenge denials based on conviction.
In addition to balancing tests, most states explicitly list public jobs that
exclude people with convictions, resolving a tension between reintegration and
public safety. Some of the most common positions are, not surprisingly, jobs
where public safety is at a premium, and include teachers, law enforcement
officers, and jobs working with at-risk populations, including the elderly.
Only six states prohibit both public and private employers from
discriminating solely on the basis of convictions.427 Of these six, Wisconsin’s
statute includes the prohibition from discriminating on the basis of conviction in
its general employment discrimination statute: “no employer . . . may engage in
any act of employment discrimination . . . on the basis of age, race, creed, color,
disability, marital status, sex, national origin, ancestry, arrest record, [or]
conviction record.”428 The statute then explains under § 111.335 that is it not
illegal to deny employment to a person “convicted of any felony, misdemeanor
or other offense the circumstances of which substantially relate to the
circumstances of the particular job or licensed activity.”429
New York430 and Pennsylvania431 have an additional provision that entitles
an applicant with a record to a statement of reasons for the job or license denial.
New York also explicitly prohibits any denial based on an arrest or dismissed
charge.432
Hawaii’s anti-discrimination statute is the most robust in that it requires even
private employers to delay background checks until after a conditional offer is
made, and it forbids employers from considering convictions older than ten
426

§ 24-5-101(2).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5(b)–(d) (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4710(f) (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 151B, § 4(9) (2017); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 750–753 (McKinney 2014); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(15)
(McKinney 2017); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9125 (2017); WIS. STAT. §§ 111.321, 111.335 (2017); see also LOVE,
ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 83, § 6:15, at 360–63.
428 WIS. STAT. § 111.321 (emphasis added).
429 § 111.335.
430 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 754.
431 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9125(c).
432 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(16).
427
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years.433 Other statutes establish a specific period of time after a conviction that
creates an automatic presumption of rehabilitation or prima facie evidence of
rehabilitation.434 In Massachusetts, an employer cannot ask about misdemeanors
after five years;435 in Washington, convictions older than ten years cannot be
considered by employers or licensing agencies.436 California prohibits the use of
convictions that were sealed or set aside.437
“Ban-the-Box” legislation is similar to some of these anti-discrimination
statutes in that it limits the use of criminal records. This legislation includes city
or state laws that require employers to remove the “box” that asks about prior
arrests and convictions on job applications.438 The employer or state agency
must consider an application or offer conditional employment before pulling a
person’s criminal history.439 The concept behind “banning-the-box” is that
decisionmakers will look more fully at an applicant’s qualifications for a
position, and not immediately reject someone because of an arrest or
conviction.440 Most current ban-the-box legislation applies to public employers,
but a growing number are including private employers, too.441 Currently, over
150 cities and counties have ban-the-box legislation, nine of which ban the box
on all private job applications as well.442
A legitimate objection to hiring a person with a conviction is an employer’s
potential exposure to a negligence-in-hiring lawsuit. Some states have passed
negligence-in-hiring laws that offer immunity to employers if they hire someone
with a conviction, provided that the employer completes some level of due
diligence.443 Often these incentivizing statutes occur in states, like New York,
that offer other protections to those with convictions.444
***

433

LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 83, § 6:17, at 367 & n.2.
Id. § 6:16, at 364 & n.7.
435 Id. § 6:14, at 359 n.4.
436 Id. § 6:17, at 367 n.2.
437 Id. § 6:17, at 367 n.1.
438 See Pinard, supra note 200, at 985.
439 See id. at 985–86.
440 See id. at 986 & n.121.
441 Id. at 986.
442 Michelle Natividad Rodriguez & Beth Avery, Ban the Box: U.S. Cities, Counties, and States Adopt Fair
Hiring Policies, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, http://www.nelp.org/publication/ban-the-box-fair-chance-hiring-stateand-local-guide/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
443 LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 83, at 362.
444 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(15) (McKinney 2017).
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Ultimately, the range of state initiatives described in this part provides
insight into creating a Reintegrative State. But these legislative relief efforts fall
short because they are discretionary, limit eligibility for reintegration, and work
in a piecemeal way before, at, or after sentencing. Part IV offers a holistic
framework accounting for these weaknesses that aims to make both civil
consequences of convictions and the use of the criminal record less permanent.
IV. A REINTEGRATION MODEL
Part III shows that the United States is not a purely punitive state. Most civil
disabilities are discretionary, and some states have begun to lessen the
permanency of the criminal record with targeted expungement statutes,
administrative mechanisms “certifying” rehabilitation, and anti-discrimination
statutes.445 The Reintegrative State can borrow from this range of approaches
and intentionally sequence them throughout the three phases of the criminal
justice system. Aligning civil consequences of convictions with principles of fair
punishment requires that these consequences be proportionate to the severity of
a criminal act and that defendants be given notice of them at sentencing.
Criminology research should help guide how to remove a conviction’s civil
consequences and public records over time. And making relief mechanisms
more automatic and less discretionary can allow them to be more cost-effective,
administratively efficient, and racially equitable.
To this end, Part IV.A identifies characteristics of a more supportive
reintegrative state by identifying key points of state-endorsed reintegration
throughout the criminal justice system, from arrest to reentry. Part IV.B argues
that the Reintegrative State must be concerned with (1) permitting discretion that
can perpetuate inequalities by race and class; (2) reducing prohibitive costs and
fees associated with reintegrative relief; (3) tackling interstate recognition
problems created by the range of relief options available; and (4) reintegrating
people with serious or repeat offenses.
A. A Holistic Framework
The statutes described in Part III show how states are doing some of the work
of reintegration. Part IV.A presents how to sequence these options before, at,
and after sentencing.

445

See supra Part III.
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1. A Pre-Sentencing Reintegration Approach
After a person is arrested, states can limit the creation of a criminal record
by decriminalizing misdemeanors and automatically removing dismissed cases
from criminal records. Ohio’s “minor misdemeanors” and New York’s
“violations” decriminalize minor misdemeanors that are non-violent, victimless,
quality-of-life crimes.446 Given that criminal court is largely a misdemeanor
court, this shift would dramatically limit the stigma of a criminal record to more
serious offenses that raise greater concerns for public safety.
Decriminalization would make minor misdemeanors more like traffic
offenses, saving the state money.447 As with traffic offenses, prosecuting nonconviction charges would not trigger criminal procedure protections, like
preliminary probable cause hearings and appointing counsel, that all
misdemeanor and felony convictions require, dramatically reducing the cost of
misdemeanor dockets. For the person charged, the creation of a permanent
criminal record is bargained away for less due process.
Proponents of Fourth and Sixth Amendment rights may balk at
decriminalization, arguing that it comes at too great a cost.448 But this worry may
exaggerate the current reality of misdemeanor courts, which constitute 90% of
criminal court dockets.449 Public defenders are overburdened by high caseloads
in many jurisdictions and cannot give them all adequate attention.450 The result
is what has been referred to as “meet ‘em and greet ‘em and plead ‘em”
encounters between appointed counsel and defendants, resulting in plea
agreements at arraignment before cases are investigated or constitutional issues
are explored.451 The tradeoff between procedural rights and the stigma of a
conviction may be overstated.
An additional reintegration approach that the study of state legislation
revealed is that automatically removing dismissed cases from a person’s record
is not common.452 From a reintegration perspective, placing a permanent mark
446

Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Criminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1057 (2015).
Id. at 1058, 1067.
448 Id. at 1059 (“[Decriminalization] makes it possible to reach more offenders by simplifying the charging
process and eliminating counsel, along with other forms of due process.”).
449 LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., supra note 164, at 24; cf. Natapoff, supra note 156, at 1320–21 (suggesting that
misdemeanors appear on court dockets at a rate four to five times as frequent as felonies).
450 See Natapoff, supra note 156, at 1343.
451 Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034 n.10 (2006).
452 See supra notes 368–72 and accompanying text.
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on a public criminal record for charges that the state does not prove or pursue,
or a person does not plead guilty to, is disproportionate to the decision to dismiss
in criminal court. Because cases are dismissed for reasons other than
innocence—the evidence was suppressed, for example—dismissed cases could
inform public and private employers about potential risk based just on an arrest.
Notations of dismissal on records do not explain the cause, and these charges
will draw disproportionately negative inferences before a person can explain the
circumstance. One of the oldest studies examining the impact of a criminal
record on employment rejections showed that although a person with an
acquittal (a type of dismissal) faired better than a person with a conviction, they
were less likely to be hired than a person with no record at all.453 Dismissals
make a difference for reintegration.
2. A Sentencing Reintegration Approach
Part III described two reintegrative sentencing approaches: first-offender
diversion statutes and certificates that relieve disabilities. Diversion statutes
offer positive incentives to both the defendant, who is offered a second chance,
and to prosecutors, whose case is closed regardless of whether a defendant meets
the conditions of diversion or not.454 This reintegrative approach is consistent
with desistence research showing that a significant portion of people with one
conviction do not reoffend.455
Certificates of Relief from Disabilities are helpful at sentencing because they
allow a sentencing judge to tailor the civil consequences to the criminal
offense.456 These certificates encourage prosecutors and defense attorneys to
consider the civil consequences during plea-bargaining as a part of criminal
punishment. Padilla457 signaled the significant need for the defense bar to
counsel defendants about civil consequences as a part of plea decisions.
Current certificate statutes either require defense counsel to identify a
specific disability458 to be lifted or all of them will be imposed.459 An alternative
approach would be to change the default. Judges would be supplied with a “civil
453

Richard D. Schwartz & Jerome H. Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 SOC. PROBS. 133, 135–36

(1962).
454
455
456
457
458
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LOVE, ROBERTS & KLINGELE, supra note 83, at 440.
See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text.
Radice, supra note 110, at 727–30.
See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 335–37 and accompanying text.
Id.
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consequences checklist” and be required to individualize the civil sanctions to
each defendant or none would apply. Judges could also decide how long the civil
sanction would last. This practice not only would give defendant’s notice of civil
consequences and likely bring them into plea negotiations, but also would
calibrate the consequences to the offense. Prosecutors and defense attorneys
could agree on what consequences, if any, would be included in a plea
agreement, or each could make arguments at sentencing for which ones should
apply.
3. A Post-Sentencing Reintegration Approach
Although states rarely employ all three post-sentencing restorative
mechanisms, different combinations of expungement statutes, administrative
relief mechanisms, and anti-discrimination statutes can help states sequence
reintegration over time. After a crime-free period, expungement statutes
currently remove convictions, primarily for first offenders and people convicted
of low-level crimes. The Reintegrative State would expand these statutes to
include more serious offenses, similar to Puerto Rico’s statute.460 This statute
expunges minor convictions after only one year, and incrementally increases the
waiting period as the offense level increases, giving the most serious felonies a
twenty-year waiting period.461
For expungements to be effective in reintegrating people with convictions,
states have to tackle the intractable problem of private online companies that do
not update their records.462 Because many of these companies qualify as
consumer reporting agencies, they fall under the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
which requires companies to report accurate information.463 Enforcement under
this act could help ensure that expunged records are removed.464 States also can
explicitly include criminal record accuracy under their own fair credit reporting
statutes.465 Making sure that fair reporting legislation applies to criminal records
and beefing up enforcement can make a difference.466 States can also condition
460

See supra note 356 and accompanying text.
Id.
462 Roberts, supra note 114, at 345 (“Perhaps the most difficult challenge when it comes to limiting access
to sealed or expunged records is effective regulation of companies that buy and sell criminal records for profit.”).
Jenny Roberts comprehensively discusses the challenges that confront sealing and expunging records. Id. at
343–47.
463 Id. at 345.
464 Id.
465 Id.
466 Id. at 345–46.
461
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buying criminal records on updating them, and charge hefty fines to companies
who fail to remove expunged records.467 To ensure that companies update their
records, state criminal record databases also have to be updated and periodically
reviewed for inaccuracies, which frequently occur and contribute to the problem.
Because expungement often requires a waiting period and recidivism is
likely to happen quickly after a conviction, Certificates of Relief can be issued
more immediately after a criminal sentence is complete to help “certify”
employability. These certificates, combined with anti-discrimination laws, can
offer employers “proof” of rehabilitation that protects them from negligence-inhiring lawsuits. Like Certificates of Employability in Colorado and Connecticut,
they can be issued at the completion of a sentence, provided there is a clear and
realistic showing that the person is committed to reintegration.468 Completing a
job-training program in prison or upon reentry would be a good proxy for
“signaling” desistence.469
For people who served lengthy sentences for serious felony convictions, the
Reintegrative State would have to confront a more serious question about when
and how to restore rights and disabilities. For this population, certificates could
be less automatic, and require a higher evidentiary showing that a person is
committed to change. The certificate program should describe types of “proof”
that people with convictions could obtain to warrant restoration. That said, for
some serious convictions, the interest in public safety could override restoring
all disabilities. Certificates of relief could be tailored and limit restoration to
areas that are not substantially related to the offending behavior.
Anti-discrimination statutes serve as good examples of how the
Reintegrative State can protect people with records from discrimination solely
based on records.470 States that require employers to write letters explaining a
rejection give added incentives for employers to consider factors surrounding
the conviction before rejecting candidates. This can ensure that the employer’s
decisions are consistent with the factors laid out by the statute. Setting actual
time limits beyond which convictions cannot be considered could strengthen
these statutes. They could provide, for example, that seven-year-old
misdemeanors and ten-year-old felonies cannot be a basis for an application
rejection. Additionally, regulatory bodies could create more specific guidelines
467
468
469
470

Id.
See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 427–37 and accompanying text.
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that help employers understand how to weigh the factors that allow for rejecting
an applicant.
B. Characteristics of the Reintegrative State
The focus on reintegration sheds light on a number of issues that consistently
burden a person’s ability to reintegrate even when relief mechanisms are
available. The Reintegrative State should reduce discretion when implementing
any restoration mechanism, remove insurmountable court costs and fees, and
address difficult issues regarding how to treat another state’s restoration of
rights.
1. Limiting Discretion
Recidivism studies support a reintegrative state where civil disabilities are
temporary, automatically removed, and tailored to an offense. Yet many of the
state’s reintegration statutes are discretionary.471 Diversion is not automatic.472
Judges and prosecutors have discretion about whether or not to apply diversion
statutes to first offenders.473 Most administrative certificate programs that offer
relief from disabilities are discretionary and based on “proof of rehabilitation,”
although what constitutes proof is usually not spelled out in the statute.474 And
most civil disabilities are discretionary, leaving the decision to issue an
employment license, for example, in the hands of regulatory agencies.
Discretion, especially in the criminal justice system, can lead to inequitable
treatment of defendants and people with records post-conviction. From police
decisions about who to stop and frisk, to judges’ decisions about the length of
incarceration, the criminal justice system’s discretionary nature has been linked
historically to its disproportionate impact on poor people of color.475 There is no
reason to believe that this would not be the case for reintegrative decisions given
that the same actors make these decisions. Discretionary administrative
processes allow regulators outside the criminal justice system to make decisions
that are often difficult to review. And discretionary processes are more
administratively time-consuming and costly than automatic procedures.

471

See supra Part III.
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-96(a) (2013) (authorizing the court to determine whether an offender is
appropriate for diversion).
473 See id.
474 See supra note 411 and accompanying text.
475 See STUNTZ, supra note 185, at 41–62; Pinard, supra note 200, at 964–65.
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The Reintegrative State should consider when discretion would make a
difference. For example, where criminal conduct is minor and a person does not
pick up a new offense for a certain period of “good conduct,” the record could
be automatically expunged and not require the filing of a petition. On the other
hand, the Reintegrative State may want people with more extensive criminal
histories to complete an administrative review to “certify” their reintegration,
given that research shows that desistence for people with more than four
convictions takes significantly longer than for those with only a few minor
ones.476
Making restoration mechanisms automatic would shift the burden from the
person with the conviction to the state. It would also remove discretion from
judges, prosecutors, and regulators, whose decisions can lead to inequitable
results.
2. Reducing or Waiving Court Costs and Fees
Although not readily apparent from any of the states’ reintegration reform
efforts described in Part III, court costs and fees create virtually insurmountable
obstacles for reintegration.477 Throughout the country, criminal courts assess
fines and fees for processing cases that are often impossible for poor defendants
to pay.478 Interest accrues on these debts, and people with convictions in some
jurisdictions are even incarcerated for not being able to pay.479 Legal scholars as
well as the Department of Justice criticize local court jurisdictions as more
concerned with “revenue collection than justice.”480
These fines and fees negatively impact reintegration. Many states do not
expunge records, even dismissals, until the court costs and fees from a
conviction are paid.481 Others charge exorbitant fees for expunging records that
make it impossible for poor people to apply.482 And a disparity exists between
states that do not charge for relief and states that do. The Reintegrative State
must consider how to make “ability to pay” determinations for defendants before
476

Bushway, Nieuwbeerta & Blokland, supra note 139, at 51.
See Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt & Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons, 75 MD.
L. REV. 486, 493 (2016).
478 Id. at 492–93.
479 Id. at 493.
480 Id. at 487; see also Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1175, 1177.
481 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32-101(g)(10) (2016).
482 See, e.g., Diversions, Expungements, & Dispositions, supra note 325 (charging $350 for expunging
diversions).
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court costs are accessed. If a person is indigent, the costs should be waived. If
states find it politically unpalatable to remove court costs entirely, they should
ensure that costs are proportionate to income and converted to civil debt that
does not impede a person from applying for expungement or certificates of relief
that they would otherwise be eligible for.
3. Grappling with Interstate Issues
A difficult question for states will be whether they should recognize the postconviction restoration of rights granted by another state.483 Vermont’s
recognition of another state’s restoration of rights offers an example of how
complicated the question can become. In one part, Vermont’s statute recognizes
post-conviction relief granted by another state immediately if authorized by
operation of statute, but only recognizes relief by courts if the relief order is on
the “grounds of rehabilitation or good behavior.”484 Not all court-issued relief
uses these factors as criteria, and even those that do may mean different
things.485 The rationale for the distinction between recognizing all statutory
relief but only some forms of judicial relief is unclear, and can easily result in
interstate recognition that is not equitable.
Another example of a potential unfair result is related to jury service. A
person convicted of a felony in Vermont can restore the right to serve on a jury
only through a pardon.486 But a person with a felony in another state, under this
new recognition statute, can move to Vermont and be eligible to serve on a jury
if the out-of-state resident’s right was restored by a relief statute that restores the
right to serve on a jury upon completion of a sentence.487 The thorny problem of
interstate restoration of rights is beyond the scope of this Article, but it serves as
an example of additional issues that states will need to address with the growing
number of state-issued relief mechanisms.
4. Reintegrating the Habitual or Serious Offender
As laid out above, the Reintegrative State would admittedly do the most
work for people with low-level, non-violent convictions. That is consistent with
483 For an extensive treatment of the state and federal issues implicated by interstate recognition of restored
civil rights, see Wayne A. Logan, “When Mercy Seasons Justice”: Interstate Recognition of Ex-Offender Rights,
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2015).
484 Id. at 45 (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit.13, § 8009(e) (2016)).
485 Id.
486 Id.
487 Id.
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current politically palpable reforms for people with convictions. For example,
as described above, most states only expunge records of “first offenders” or
people with low-level offenses. Other states require waiting periods of seven to
ten years of good conduct before they are willing to make changes to a person’s
legal status as an “offender.” The focus on minor offenses also aligns with the
criminology research on desistence. In many ways, this focus would make a
major difference because the vast majority of people with convictions are people
with misdemeanors or minor felonies. They are people who spend little to no
time in jail.
Focusing complete reintegration on this population, however, leaves open
the obvious question about whether the Reintegrative State would ever fully
reintegrate a person released who committed a rape of a child or committed
felony murder. To some extent, though, the question of how to reintegrate “the
worst offenders” may be moot because they are much less likely to be released
from prison. For the most part, the reality is that federal and state sentencing for
the most serious felonies result in life sentences that no longer offer the
possibility of parole. Yet, there still will be individuals convicted of crimes
against persons who will be released, and they will certainly create the biggest
obstacle to a truly reintegrative ideal. Criminology research will need to do more
to study the likelihood of recidivism for this population to help guide
policymakers. Under the reintegrative approach set out in this Article, though,
the Reintegrative State does not aim to fully reintegrate every person with a
conviction. But even this population should benefit from the characteristics of
the Reintegrative State. They should be afforded a warning prior to sentencing
of the extensive collateral sanctions facing them, and collateral consequences
facing them upon release should be proportional to the severity of their offense
and rationally related to the type of crime they committed. This subset of the
population with criminal records, although small, will be subject to the greatest
number of collateral consequences, making it harder, if not impossible, for this
population—potentially the most vulnerable population to recidivism—to
reintegrate.
CONCLUSION
To be sure the prisoner has violated the social contract; to be sure he
must be punished to vindicate the law, to acknowledge the suffering of
the victim, and to deter future crimes. Still, the prisoner is a person;
still, he or she is part of the family of humankind.
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Were we to enter the hidden world of punishment, we should be
startled by what we see.488

Over the past three decades, scholars, legislatures, and advocates have
exposed the startling hidden world of post-conviction punishment. The
reintegrative legislation discussed in Part III shows the ways that the state can
make this punishment more visible at sentencing, more proportionate to the
offense, more administratively efficient, and more equitable.
Reintegration will inevitably be caught between the state’s interests in
reintegrating all people with criminal records and in protecting society from
future offenses. These dual purposes are not necessarily in conflict. The
Reintegrative State would view these objectives as equally important and
mutually supportive. Restoring people to their preconviction status over time is
consistent with society’s interest in reducing recidivism and encouraging
desistence from crime. Ultimately, this Article aims to contribute to this reentry
moment by arguing that the goal of the Reintegrative State is to establish points
throughout the criminal justice process, from sentencing to reentry, that mitigate
and ultimately remove the stigma of a conviction.

488 Justice Anthony Kennedy, Address at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html.

